Arts & Social Sciences
Te Kura Kete Aronui

Host country economic issues regarding immigration are frequently placed into two large categories, which are sometimes summarized by the words “integration” and “impact”. Referring to the outcomes experienced, and actions taken, by immigrants as their time in the domestic economy increases, "Integration" covers a broad range of issues including earnings, employment, education, health, fertility, and geographic mobility. "Impact" tends to be a more macroeconomic concept and refers to the economic impact of new immigration on the pre-existing population, which includes both the domestic born and previous cohorts of immigrants.

“Impact” covers a broad range of issues including the size of the economy, the average standard of living (typically and imperfectly proxied by GDP per capita), average wage rates, the distribution of standards of living and wages, economies of scale in production and consumption, complementarity and substitution in production, fiscal expenditures, tax revenues, product markets, international trade and demographics. Both sets of topics can be controversial, but issues involving the economic impact of immigration tend to be more so. Therefore, although this talk takes an economic perspective, it is recognized that this is only one lens and immigration policy development involves a much broader scope that, in the context of countries such as New Zealand and Canada, is sometimes summarized as "nation building".

In order to set the context, this talk first and very briefly surveys issue related to immigrant economic integration. It then turns its attention to a selected set of topics related to the economic impact of immigration. Academics view estimating economic impacts as extremely challenging, and, in part, this is a summary midway through an ongoing debate.

This study reports on simulations of the impact of different international migration scenarios on economic outcomes in New Zealand, both at the macro level and at a disaggregated level (industries, occupations, international trade, and the distribution of income). The computer model predicts economic outcomes in 2021 following a change in the size and composition of immigration, relative to a “business-as-usual” scenario. It is found that increased immigration reduces production costs and, consequently, improves competitiveness of New Zealand firms. This leads to higher demand, greater exports, improvement in the balance of the government accounts, and an increase in real per capita GDP despite the larger population. Quantitatively, however, the biggest effect of immigration is the expansion of the scale of the economy. The effect on GDP per capita is rather more modest and depends strongly on whether immigration can trigger higher productivity growth. The results of the computer simulations are compared with those of a similar study conducted in the 1980s and of a more recent study on the impact of immigration on the Australian economy.

We examine the contribution of local workforce characteristics, such as the presence of immigrants and local skills, to the probability of certain innovation and productivity outcomes among firms. We combine firm-level micro data with area-level workforce characteristics as measured in the Census. We examine a range of innovation outcomes and test for the relationship for selected subgroups of firms. At the broad city and urban area level, there is a positive association between the percent migrants in an area and innovation. Similarly, productivity is positively related with the share of migrants in the population. However, once we control for a range of other factors that influence innovation and productivity (such as the skill composition of the work force, firm size and R&D expenditure) the positive association is significantly weakened.

In this paper we provide a synthesis of some twenty projects conducted in New Zealand during the last five years on the economic impacts of immigration. We also identify some remaining knowledge gaps that can be addressed in future research. We focus on the impacts on the host country, New Zealand, and do not discuss research on the impact on the source countries and on the selectivity of the migration process. Impacts covered include migrant integration and adjustment, fiscal impact, housing markets, internal migration, labour market outcomes, trade and tourism, innovation, productivity growth and disaggregate effects on specific industries and types of households. We conclude that immigration had made a positive contribution to economic outcomes in New Zealand and that fears for negative economic impacts such as net fiscal costs, house price inflation and increasing unemployment are largely unfounded. Future research should focus particularly on the path of adjustment over time, induced physical and human capital investment in the economy, the consequences of growing diversity and differences in impacts between temporary and long-term migration.

It is commonly thought that the average level of education of immigrants is greater than the typical level of education of workers in the same occupations. The gap may be particularly large during the first few years after the immigrants have taken up residency. An important reason for this over-qualification of immigrants is that foreign qualifications, and the work experience gained abroad subsequently, may not be fully transferable to the host country. At the same time, some migrants may be employed in occupations for which they have a high ability (and which sometimes motivated their migration), even though they may not have obtained the usual qualifications, i.e. they are under-qualified. Educational mismatch can affect the economic integration of immigrants and the measurement of the return to investment in education, and it can lead to lower labour productivity. While the extent of this problem has been measured by means of micro level data in Australia and North America in recent years, a similar analysis has not yet been conducted in New Zealand. In this paper, we use data from the 1996, 2001 and 2006 censuses to examine difference between each migrant's actual years of education and the estimated typical years of education in the occupation in which they work. This is done separately by gender and for narrowly defined occupations (at the 5-digit level). We examine how this gap varies with time spent in New Zealand, immigrant's age at arrival, and country of origin.

As a part of the Integration of Immigrants Programme (IIP), a survey was conducted in Hamilton to explore the experiences of recently arrived South African and British migrants.

The majority of our participants were positive, optimistic, and talkd about migration as a growth experience. They were initially attracted to New Zealand because they wanted to change or improve aspects of their lifestyle. Many secured employment before arrival or, because they were skilled migrants, finding work did not present too many problems. This was also reflected in their high levels of employment mobility, especially within the first few years of arrival. While this mobility was positive for our participants because they were able to secure employment that fulfilled their professional aspirations, this mobility can present retention issues for employers who actively recruit skilled migrants.

Initial findings of our research indicate a holistic approach to support of skilled migrants is required because these migrants tend to choose New Zealand as a place to live because of “lifestyle” reasons. A holistic approach involves supporting both the migrant and their family at work, at home and in the community.

Australia’s immigration program has undergone revolutionary transformation in the last thirty years – this has involved change in the ethnic composition of the intake and change from ‘permanent’ to ‘long-term’ population movement. It has produced major impact in Australia’s cities and poses challenges for future Australian national identity.

In addition to these qualitative transformations, there has been a substantial quantitative increase in the scale of immigration: the grant of permanent residence visas more than doubled, from a total of 80,000 in 1999-2000.Those gaining visas in the skill category have increased by a factor of three, while the increase in some long-term visa categories has been larger.

This paper, in addition to discussing the nature and magnitude of change, will consider the politics of immigration in Australia and shifts in public opinion. The last part of the discussion will examine the findings of public opinion surveys as they relate to integration of immigrants. Particular attention will be devoted to the 2007 Scanlon Foundation Social Cohesion survey, which reached targeted samples in regions of high immigrant concentration.

Proponents of neo-liberal globalisation portrayed it as an economic model designed to secure greater efficiency and – in the long run – higher incomes for all. Yet the reality was a project of political domination that led to accelerated processes of social transformation in both poor and rich countries. The neo-liberal ideology called for free flows across borders: flows of investment, commodities and people. But the principle of free flows of people seemed to conflict with the desire to maintain nation-state sovereignty. Yet in fact national regimes of migrant differentiation made it easier to stratify and control labour: All developed companies opened the door to inflows of‘human capital’ (whatever the cost to origin countries), while creating exclusionary rules for lower-skilled workers and refugees.

Privileges for the highly-skilled fitted well with trends to informalisation and casualisation of lower-skilled workers, leading to labour-market hierarchies based on gender, race, ethnicity, origins and legal status. At the same time various forms of non-economic migration grew: student mobility, retirement migration, marriage migration and so on. The neo-liberal dream was dualistic: a cosmopolitan, mobile world for elites; a world of barriers, exploitation and security controls for the rest.

How has this dream stood up to the shock of the economic crisis? There is evidence of reductions in new migrations and increased return migration. Yet many migrants are reluctant to return home, for both economic and social reasons. It is too early to predict long-term effects, but it is instructive to look at the lessons of previous crises. The key question is whether the present crisis is conjuntural (like the Asian
crisis of 1997-99), or whether it is likely to herald major structural changes in the capitalist world order – like the world economic crisis of the 1930s or the ‘oil crisis’ of the mid-1970s. In my view, we can expect major structural changes in patterns of trade, investment and labour deployment. However, there are also important differences to previous situation, so that the directions of change cannot yet be made
out.

The past 10 years have coincided with unprecedented levels of skilled migration to New Zealand, Australia and Canada - countries which are at once competitors and collaborators in terms of policy formation. This paper compares their policy approaches in the past 10 years, as they participate in the 'looming war for skills'. It defines their progressive shift to a 'two step migration' model, the rise of employer sponsored flows, and the growing significance of international students as a skilled migration resource. Based on the latest available longitudinal survey data, the paper then describes employment outcomes for skilled principal applicants in each country, highlighting areas of similarity and difference to date. Finally, key findings from a major recent Australian study on international students in skilled migration are defined, including the extent to which the study-migration pathway enhances early professional employment outcomes.

Drawing on data from the Longitudinal Immigration Survey: New Zealand, the research examines two major questions: 1) How do immigrants' experiences vary across settlement regions as a function of the proportion of the overseas-born population? and 2) Is there a "tipping point" at which increasing proportions of immigrants result in more negative outcomes for new settlers? Perceptions of discrimination, difficulties obtaining employment and life satisfaction in New Zealand receive particular attention, and policy implications are discussed.

Richard Bedford, University of Waikato, Hamilton and Charlotte Bedford, University of Adelaide, Australia with
Anne-Marie Masgoret and Manuila Tausi, Department of Labour, Wellington

The Longitudinal Immigration Survey: New Zealand (LisNZ) is a uniquely rich source of data on migrants' labour market and settlement outcomes. But how representative is the sample? Perhaps successful migrants are over-represented, leading to overoptimistic conclusions? We provide a partial answer to these questions by investigating the consequences of attrition between waves 1 and 2 of the survey. We estimate the extent to which attrition affects conclusions about employment, wages, satisfaction, and dwelling ownership.

International education is often measured by its export value and total enrolment instead of international students’ experience and welfare. Therefore, as temporary migrants in Australia, international students’ welfare does not receive any due attention unless there is an impending threat to this lucrative industry. This is evident when the media coverage of the recent Indian students’ unrest forced the Australian Government to introduce a series of measures, including high delegation visits to India, because it is threatening the AUD$15 billion export market.

In response to the media outrage, the Australian Government repeatedly preached about social inclusion for international students. However, this is not realistic to a certain extent. As temporary migrants, international students are not provided with the same benefits and assistance that are enjoyed by their domestic counterparts (e.g. education subsidies). Further, as non-voting citizens, international students also
do not have any significant influence over government policies and legislations, which often impede them from being socially included in the first place. This is evident in the State of Victoria where it is legal for international students not to receive any transport concession even though this legislation is clearly discriminatory.

This paper aims to illuminate the challenges that international students in Australia face due to their status as temporary migrants. In doing so, the paper will also make due recommendations to address these challenges accordingly.

The three Pacific countries that have engaged most actively with the Recognised Seasonal Employer work policy are Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. Tuatagaloa Joe Annandale, matai of Poutasi Village in Falealili District in Samoa has developed strong relationships with a small group of employers in the Hawke’s Bay region and is determined to make the RSE scheme work well in the interests of family and community development in rural Samoa. Kolotia Fotu heads the RSE unit in Tonga’s Ministry of Labour Commerce and Industries, and she is equally determined to make sure the RSE scheme serves the interests of Tongans, especially Tongans from outer island rural areas. Sylvie Kalmet, co-ordinates recruitment for the RSE in the Employment Services Unit of the Department of Labour in Vanuatu – the largest country supplier of RSE workers in the Pacific. These three speakers reflect on the operation of RSE work policy from the perspectives of their communities and their countries.

There are three key stakeholders in the Recognised Seasonal Employer work policy: employers in New Zealand's horticulture and viticulture industries, employees from the Pacific Islands and some other countries in a regulated seasonal work programme, and the governments of New Zealand and several Pacific Forum countries who have a vested interest in supporting economic growth in their respective countries. The short-term outcomes of the RSE work policy have been the subject of an independent evaluation and in this presentation we reflect on some of the impacts of the policy on the five original kick start states: Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. While there are many differences in detail in the way the kick start states have approached the RSE scheme, this presentation adopts a comparative approach in an attempt to establish some of the high-level achievements as well as the main on-going challenges associated with the RSE as the scheme enters its third season of operation.

Overall, the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy has achieved what it was set up to do. Employers in the horticulture and viticulture sectors have access to a reliable, skilled, seasonal workforce and Pacific workers from Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu have benefitted economically. These achievements can be attributed to the effectiveness of the intended policy mechanisms as well as other unintended mechanisms, including those that have emerged around the management of workers.

In this session we draw on findings from the independent evaluation of the RSE policy and discuss the reasons behind the achievements, and conversely, why the policy has not worked so well for some participants. We also consider what these findings mean for RSE policy as it beds down and moves forward.

Household surveys from Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu are used to describe some impacts for Pacific Island households of sending seasonal migrants to New Zealand under the Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy. While many long-term changes are likely in the lives of households that supply RSE workers, the short period that the policy has been in operation makes it feasible to consider only a narrower range of impacts, including incomes and expenditures, durable ownership and dwelling amenities, and health and diets.

The focus of this paper is on the strategies immigrants adopt in order to develop their life and work plans as workers in London. More specifically, the paper examines the strategies immigrants engage in when they attempt to formalise or legalise their irregular immigration status or informal labour market participation. I explore the hypothesis that the state creates complex and contradictory modes of regulation and exclusion and that immigrants are frequently compelled to reconstruct or circumvent them. The research was located in London, a multi-ethnic city with many recent arrivals, particularly in the past 10-15 years, from all over the globe. The data used in the paper, a small part of the overall data, comes from the Immigrant Work Strategies and Networks project, which aimed to investigate how immigrant work strategies (both formal and informal employment) are shaped or mediated by their social networks in the process of settlement and integration.

Jessie Taylor, a Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria, is Chair of the Law Institute of Victoria Refugee Law Reform Committee and Assistant Secretary of the Council for Civil Liberties in Victoria, Australia. She was Rotary Club of Australia Young Achiever for 2008. She will discuss her recent trip to Indonesia, her interviews with 250 asylum seekers and their children in detention there, and Australia’s involvement in imprisoning them in Indonesian jails. With the Rudd Government’s recent improvements to Australia’s refugee policy, there is a sense that the worst is behind us. However, with the Christmas Island facility in full swing, perhaps questions should be asked about a continuing policy of ‘out of sight, out of mind’.

The research is a unique prospective cohort study interviewing 33 refugees at the point of selection in Bhutan and again at three points after arrival in New Zealand. This paper will describe the context for the development of the study, the research methods and report preliminary results, focussing particularly on the knowledge individuals had about New Zealand at the time of selection. We will discuss both the way they accessed information and the nature of the information and expectations that they did have. Some possible implications for the managing of transitions and settlement will be discussed.

‘Quota Refugees Ten Years On: Perspectives on Integration, Community and Identity' is a three year research programme (2008-2010) that explores the perspectives of people who arrived in New Zealand through the refugee quota category ten or more years ago.

The key component of the research focuses on a face-to-face survey of 500-750 people who came to New Zealand under the Refugee Quota Programme from 1993 to 1999. In addition, a small number of case studies and focus groups are planned to gather more in-depth qualitative data. The main groups of arrivals during the period 1993 to 1999 were from Somalia, Ethiopia, Iraq and Vietnam.

This paper will look at progress and learnings to date, methodological considerations, and next steps in moving forward with the research.

Ethnic diversity is an essential part of New Zealand society. We are one of the most diverse societies in the OECD with over 230 ethnicities recorded in the last census indicating a relatively rapid change in our socio-demographic composition over the last 15 years. Such changes are a reflection of international trends resulting from globalisation, increased migration, and the subsequent diaspora communities. Governments across the globe have responded to the challenges and opportunities that diversity brings in a variety of ways. In the current economic climate there has been more focus on understanding how we can tap into the potential benefits of diversity. Research and best practice suggests that there are a number of optimal societal conditions or ‘precursors’ which allow us to harness these benefits. This presentation will examine these precursors and highlight current initiatives being led by the Office of Ethnic Affairs to contribute to bringing these ideas to fruition and adapting them to the New Zealand context.

Increased migration has been among the most significant demographic changes in Asia and the Pacific over the last five decades, during which massive changes in the form and scale of mobility have taken place. Economic factors, in particular, helped drive this change. Yet, there is a growing appreciation of the role that environmental change has played and will play in future migration, as global concern grows about the impact of climate change. This paper reports on a study of the potential impact of climate change on population mobility in the Asia-Pacific region recently undertaken for the Asian Development Bank.

Among the key findings of this study is that climate change needs to be conceptualised as an additional factor among an array of existing factors driving migration. Policies and strategies to deal with climate change should not be seen as separate if they are to be effective. Indeed, a migratory response to climate change will be determined by past patterns of migration – whether environmental or economic, forced, permanent, or temporary – through long-established networks.

The interaction between environmental change and migration is little understood, however, even though its implications for migration – both within countries and across international borders – could be enormous. This study provides an initial analytical review of climate change and migration in Asia and the Pacific and discusses possible implications for policy and practice. It takes the view that if migration due to climate change is managed effectively, humanitarian crises will be minimised, conflicts avoided, and countries can benefit.

The paper examines existing knowledge on links between environmental change and migration and how this relates to the potential impacts of climate change and migration. It discusses the key distinctions between mobility as a strategy for adapting to the impacts of environmental deterioration and as a displacement when deterioration becomes so extreme that people are forced to leave an area.

The Asia-Pacific region has been identified as the global region most at risk of experiencing negative impacts from climate change. The study identifies a number of ‘hot spots’ where the adverse effects of climate change are likely to be greatest. Impacts of four types are modelled to identify areas most at risk from:
· Coastal vulnerability, inundation and storm surges.
· Cyclones and typhoons.
· Riparian flooding, glacier melt.
· Water stress.

On this basis, the following types of hot spot areas were identified:
· Low lying coastal areas, including many of Asia’s mega-cities.
· Delta regions – some of the most intensively settled areas in the world.
· Low lying atolls and coral islands.
· Semi-arid and low humidity areas.
The urban and rural populations living in these hot spots are estimated and projected forward to 2050.

It is argued that it is not possible to project the numbers of people in these areas who are likely to move as a result of climate change impacts because of the large uncertainties in both the prediction of the scale, intensity and location of climate change impacts but also in the measurement of contemporary internal and international migration. However, the study identifies some of the types of movements what are likely to result from the effects of climate change. It differentiates between linear migration developments which involve intensification and elaboration of movement along existing migration corridors from non-linear movements which are new migration developments.

The study concludes that it is possible to not only cope with these changes but also to harness population mobility to reduce poverty and enhance economic and social development in the region. To do this, there will be a need for major improvements in many areas – more effective migration management, strengthening governance, developing appropriate funding mechanisms to facilitate adaption to climate change, enhancing international cooperation on climate change issues, expanding and improving development assistance mechanisms, and developing sound economic development policy and practice throughout the region. Moreover, these changes are urgent for two reasons: (i) some of the impacts are already in evidence, and (ii) because the changes required involve substantial institutional, structural, and cultural change, it will take considerable lead time to successfully effect these changes. Many of the impacts of climate change are likely to be most severely felt several decades into the future. To avoid the poverty and suffering that could arise from inaction, and to help reduce inequality and improve the general wellbeing of Asia and the Pacific residents, multi-level policy interventions are required now.

According to the UNFCCC secretariat as many as 200 million people may be displaced as a result of climate change by 2050. Indeed the likelihood of large numbers of climate migrants has been a theme adopted by numerous researchers, environmental organisations and political parties. However, there has been very little consideration of just what the nature of this population movement will be. Will people move as individuals and families or will larger groups be relocated?

Using historical and recent examples, this paper explores the implications for entire Pacific Island communities that may be forced to relocate from their present locations. In particular it examines the implications for sustaining the integrity of communities when their villages or other settlement forms become uninhabitable. One of the key considerations is the disconnection from the land that such movements will cause (with not even the possibility of caretaker populations to 'keep the home fires burning'), and that is likely to rupture community and individual identities, and render such adaptive action highly problematical. For some of the globe's most exposed communities adaptation is likely to fail and mitigation of green house gas emissions remains critical.

Climate change is now featuring in migration discourse around the world. This paper asks, to what extent the views and perspectives of potential climate change-related migrants are heard and heeded. Drawing on Paton's postgraduate research, this paper provides a platform for grassroot Tuvaluan voices. In Tuvalu, as in other Pacific countries, the peoples’ community orientation is one of the country’s greatest assets. Policy makers need to build on this, not undermine it. This means not casting the people as victims, but recognising them as people with their own resources and their own solutions.

This paper will encourage us to look at what the people are really telling us. This means asking ourselves a series of questions: Are people already migrating? Where to and why? What’s important to them? Can we build this into the solutions we propose? How can we put individuals, families and communities into the driver’s seat when we know that migration policies are controlled by the sovereignty interests of receiving States?

What is the nature of vulnerability to climate change at the community scale in rural Vanuatu? Which approaches to community-based adaptation (CBA) are most appropriate to reduce this vulnerability? These questions are important to consider in the migration-adaptation context. To do this, I draw on my PhD research which examined local perceptions, values and experiences of dealing with climate stress in three rural communities in Vanuatu. Vulnerability to climate change is shaped by multiple, interacting stressors, emerging largely from processes of social change. Changing livelihoods, social institutions, traditional knowledge and population are particularly prominent pressures. CBA needs to incorporate these multiple ‘nonclimate’ stressors if it is to meaningfully reduce vulnerability. It is in this multistressor context that individual migration decisions are commonly made, though seldom in response to environmental change per se. Migration plays a role in local adaptive capacity, providing remittances that are particularly important in times of climate stress. Given that CBA is largely about increasing the choices people can make in their own proactive adaptive processes, migration should be viewed as a legitimate part of CBA alongside in-situ responses – provided that it is a choice, rather than a ‘last resort’.