Technological Problems

Both Germany and America experienced technological problems with their torpedoes. In 1939 Lt Gunther Prien fired seven torpedoes at HMS Royal Oak which subsequently sank but only two torpedoes detonated. Only two weeks later Lt Wilhelm Zahn skipper of U-56, was presented with one of Britain's most powerful warships HMS Nelson, at that time hosting not only important officers but also Sir Winston Churchill himself. Unknown to these dignitaries U-56 launched three torpedoes at the battleship. Inside U-56 Zahn and his crew waited impatiently for the tell tale explosions. Instead the crew heard two clanging noises as metal merely hit metal. The torpedoes had merely struck the side of the battleship and sunk to the bottom of the North Sea. Deep dejection overwhelmed Zahn and his crew to the extent that on return to Germany Admiral Donitz was forced to take them off U-boat duties.¹⁶ After all it was an extremely dangerous task for a submarine to get through British defences and return home safely. Further, surprise would no longer be an element possible against anchored British warships in their home ports.

Similarly, during 1943 Lt Cdr John Scott of the USS Tunny fired ten Mk 14 torpedoes at a range of 800 yards at two very large Japanese aircraft carriers. Most of the torpedoes detonated prematurely and the carriers escaped with some damage. Due to these faulty torpedoes many good commanders were accused of failure and incompetence. However when aces such as Richard O'Kane and Dudley Morton started complaining action had to be taken.

The main problem with the Mk 14 was with the magnetically operated detonating device. Torpedo experts overlooked the fact that a vessel's magnetic earth-field varies according to its position on the globe.¹⁷ It was nearly two years before the USN established the cause of all the defects. The depth mechanism and contact exploders were also found to be faulty. This was undetected in the prewar navy because it was considered a serious offence to lose a torpedo in a training run. Therefore, many submariners had never heard the sound of a live torpedo detonating. The Mk 14 cost $10,000 each, a substantial sum. The Bureau of Ordnance was to blame for being overly niggardly.¹⁸ Even when Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, C-in-C Submarine Fleet South West Pacific, tested the torpedoes, found fault and then complained, the Bureau of Ordnance was slow to react.¹⁹

16. Geoffrey Regan, The Guiness Book of Naval Blunders, (Enfield), p. 114.

17. Winton, p. 156.

18. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, (Hammondsworth, 1984), p. 484.

19. Wheeler, pp. 44-47.

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