Grand Escort Headquarters

While the Americans and Allies engaged in convoy protection, Japan never really possessed an anti-submarine warfare branch until late in the war.²⁶ From their observation of the American ship building programme, the Japanese became convinced that the USN would seek a decisive fleet action as soon as possible.²⁷ With limited resources the Japanese simply never saw any use in building escorts.

The fundamental weakness of Japanese anti-submarine machinery lay in the fact that it received little backing at navy headquarters. Therefore Grand Escort Headquarters was established in 1943, but it offered too little too late. To the amazement of its new communications commander there was neither any unified tactical doctrine nor unified communication training between individual escorts. In fact, escorts tended to be supplied with inferior equipment and personnel with inferior records. Priority always went to capital ships.²⁸ To make matters worse the Americans learnt from the Germans to hunt in packs, the Japanese did not. The Americans also had ULTRA at their disposal.²⁹ The Japanese failed to realise their naval codes had been broken.

American Dominance

The U.S. submarine force was composed in total of about 50,000 officers and men. This represented 1.6 percent of the total navy complement. However they accounted for 55 percent of Japan's maritime losses.³⁰ The U.S.N. submarine service sunk over 5.5 million tons of shipping, including a battleship, eight carriers and eleven cruisers. They accounted for over two thirds of merchant shipping and over a third of warships. 200 submarines accounted for 201 warships and 1113 merchant ships.³¹ These official figures do not take into account unofficial kills which often happened and the huge damage caused by American submarines. The loss of Japanese maritime personnel inflicted by submarine was heavy.³² Further, the psychological effect the submarine had on Japanese seamen was devastating.

Out of 16000 men who actually served on American war patrols approximately 22 percent died, and fifty-two submarines were lost from all causes including accidents. The Japanese lost 130 submarines.

26. Oi, p. 385.

27. Ibid., p. 388.

28. Ibid., p. 403.

29. ULTRA is short for Ultra Secret. They were priority messages decoded from Japanese communications. The Allies could intercept Japanese transmissions, decode them and consquently direct submarine forces more efficiently against Japanese shipping.

30. Blair, p. 879.

31. Winton, p. 155.

32. Blair, p. 878.

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