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Quoting

Integrated quotes to support an argument—excerpt 3

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Task: Critically examine and explain Locke's distinction between the Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary qualities, providing at least one example of each. According to Locke's account are the secondary and tertiary qualities in objects in the same way that primary qualities are? What are his reasons for this aspect of his account? (From a 200 level philosophy paper, 2000 words)

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Tye (2007) Segment 1 | Segment 2

Background: This excerpt has been taken from a paragraph towards the end of the essay. In this paragraph she is attempting to link the more ancient texts to more recent discussions of this problem.

Philosophical discussion on this aspect of 'perception cognition' is currently of interest in the field of information theory, within which Locke's Essay is still discussed. While there appears to be mutual respect between theorists, there is still lack of agreement. Tye (2007) identifies a problem first raised by Aristotle, namely 'the problem of common sensibles' which Tye (2007) considers relevant. Tye (2007, p. 287) claims that no quality, primary or secondary, is ever 'sensed' in isolation from a complex myriad of other contingent sensations; therefore "sense-specific experiences do not exist. They are the figments of philosophers' and psychologists' imaginations" (Tye, 2007, p. 293).. His studies show that "experienced-togetherness" (Tye, 2007, p. 289), an overarching unified multi-modal experience, the sum of which is greater than any individual parts, cannot be "phenomenologically fragmented" (Tye, 2007, p. 290). Removing all but one channel of sense-data leaves no actual experience at all. Tye's (2007) conclusions indicate that he is in accord with Locke's explanation of primary qualities as isomorphic to the object observed, but that secondary qualities are also part of the overall phenomenological package, despite the possibility of error when making meaning of what is perceived. An issue with Tye (2007) is that his work does not really attempt to address the problem of the "veil-of-perception", and leaves the reader wondering how he accounts for reality, thus to some extent it speaks past the issue.
References:

Tye, M. (2007). The problem of common sensibles. Erkenntnis 66(1), 287-303 doi:10.1007/s10670-9032-0