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# Waikato Islamic Studies Review

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University of Waikato Islamic Studies Group
A Tale of Two Dialogues: 
21st Century Christian-Muslim Initiatives

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Introduction

The nature of the relationship between Muslims and Christians has been ever marked by three fundamental dynamics: mutual antipathy, mutual affinity and mutual inquiry. In the modern era, and certainly since the mid-20th century, a sense of genuinely mutual inquiry – that is, of seeking, together, to understand each other, learn about each other, and strive together for the greater good of the common world we together indwell – has clearly emerged and become active. Such inquiry is born out of the sense of affinity, and given urgent impetus by the realisation of the negative consequences of allowing antipathy to gain the upper hand.

Christian engagement with Islam in the modern era – and certainly since the middle of the 20th century – is a story of affinity and inquiry struggling with an inherent countervailing tendency to antipathy. Early in the twentieth century missionary elements in the Christian Church began to question long-held exclusivist and negative assumptions held toward other religions. The question of the proper relation of Christianity to other faiths contributed to the agenda of the early ecumenical movement that led, by mid-century, to the formation of the World Council of Churches (WCC). So, by the middle of the 20th century, far-reaching changes were underway: other religions and their peoples were honoured, from within the world-wide Christian
church, as dialogue-partners and co-religionists capable of common cause action. In post-war mid-twentieth century the early emergence of globalization was beginning to be felt and improvements to mass-media, enabling a more rapid and immediate exchange of information, were well underway. Euro-centric Christianity was giving way to a genuinely global perspective of a Christian oikumene, that is, the emerging sense of the various churches joining together in a worldwide fellowship so expressing some measure of unity in diversity, and it is at this juncture that new — indeed epoch-making — developments occur.

Although there are many interesting dialogical developments in the latter half of the 20th century, of particular interest for us today are two 21st century initiatives undertaken by Christians reaching out to engage the Muslim world. The ‘Building Bridges’ seminar series, begun by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 2002, was very much a ‘top-down’ approach. By contrast, the Christian-Muslim Theological Forum (Theologisches Forum Christentum-Islam), initiated by an ecumenical group of young scholars in Germany, also in 2002, was more a ‘bottom-up’ process. Both have settled into a regular, more or less annual, conference-style meeting pattern with quality published outcomes. Both can be said to have been born of goodwill forged by mutual affinity and are at the cutting edge of contemporary developments in mutual inquiry. So what are they, exactly? And what lessons might they hold?

**Building Bridges**

The intention at the outset of the Building Bridges programme was to establish an environment for interfaith bridge-building in the sense of “creating new routes for information, appreciation and respect to travel freely and safely in both directions between Christians and Muslims, Muslims and Christians.”\(^1\) Each year since 2002 a

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group of invited Muslim and Christian scholars has met for three days of deliberation on a theological theme by means of public lectures, closed plenaries, and small-group sessions. Meetings have alternated between Christian- and Muslim-majority venues. Initiated in England, Building Bridges moved to a Muslim-majority context for its second meeting, held in Doha, Qatar, in 2003, on the subject *Scriptures in Dialogue: Christians and Muslims Studying the Bible and the Qurʾān Together.*

Plenary presentations included an account of how the Bible is perceived by and functions for Christians; an explanation of the prominence of listening as a Qurʾānic notion; a reflection on the Qurʾān as theophany; a consideration of the ethics of gender discourse in Islam; a review of the history of biblical interpretation… and explication of various challenges of modernism, post-modernism, and fundamentalism.  

The 2004 seminar on prophecy considered the Christian and Muslim perspectives on the nature of prophecy. Also, two participants gave public lectures in which they analysed the emerging Building Bridges methodology. Miroslav Volf celebrated “the practice of Christians and Muslims reading their scriptures together” which was the main feature of the Doha seminar, and Mustansir Mir asserted that a credible Qurʾān-based “post-prophetic theology of inter faith dialogue” is both necessary and possible.  

The fourth seminar, in 2005, was hosted jointly by Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim institutions in Sarajevo. The undergirding theme was the Common Good and the seminar addressed topics of faith and national identity. Case studies from Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as British, Malaysian, and West African contexts explored issues

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4 Mustansir Mir, ‘Scriptures in dialogue: are we reckoning without the host?’ in Ipgrave (ed.), *Bearing the Word,* 13-19.
of citizenship, religious believing and belonging, and the relationship between government and religion.

While unapologetically an initiative of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Building Bridges has been intrinsically ecumenical since its inception—a fact made all the more evident in 2006, when, for a second time, the Seminar was the guest of Georgetown University (a Roman Catholic, indeed Jesuit, institution) in Washington, DC. Christian and Muslim understandings of divine justice, political authority, and religious freedom were topics of discussion. In addition to scripture, the seminar examined, among others, writings of Saint Augustine, al-Ghazālī, the 16th C reformer Martin Luther, and Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as modern Islamic declarations on human rights. The discussion of texts other than scripture was a different experience from ‘scripture-dialogue’.

The sixth seminar was held in Singapore in 2007. With the theme of ‘Humanity in Context’, its focus was what it is to be human and ranged over topics of human dignity, alienation and destiny; diversity; and the relationship of humanity to the wider environment. The next seminar, in 2008, considered the interpretation and translation of revelation in the two traditions. Issues touched on included the ‘pre-history’ of revelation; the historical particularity and universal significance of an ultimate revelation; the possibility of continuing revelation; issues of translating the Word; and passages in which scripture itself reflects on how scripture is to be interpreted. This seminar incorporated discussions of *Generous Love*, a theology of interfaith relations prepared in early 2008 by the Anglican Communion Network for Inter Faith Concerns, and the final section of *A Common Word*—the pan-Muslim call for dialogue promulgated in October 2007. Building Bridges 2009, held in Istanbul in the anniversary year of Charles Darwin, focussed on the interface between science and religion. Observing that Darwin’s legacy “is by no means uniformly hostile to religious
faith’ Archbishop Rowan Williams argued that “we need to understand better the whole nature of the challenge that scientific research poses to theology”.\(^5\)

With *Tradition and Modernity* as the theme, the seminar in 2010 examined changing patterns in religious authority and different conceptions of freedom emerging in the modern world. Building Bridges returned to Qatar in 2011 for its tenth seminar. In a memo to invitees, Archbishop Williams pointed out that since the topic was prayer, this meeting, more so than in any previous, would take up matters of personal faith, practice, and experience alongside academic questions. In preparation, each attendee wrote briefly on, “What does prayer mean to you?” These mini-essays became part of this seminar’s resource anthology, along with scripture selections and excerpts from a broad range of classical and modern Christian and Muslim writings about prayer. The eleventh seminar – the final for Rowan Williams as Archbishop of Canterbury – had as its theme ‘Death, Resurrection and Human Destiny in Christian and Muslim Perspective’.

Since the retirement of Williams, Georgetown University has assumed the key organisational role, taking over from Lambeth Palace in London. What began as an Anglican initiative, albeit with a very ecumenical face, is now a Catholic (Jesuit) responsibility, but no less ecumenical for that. Indeed, together with Anglicans, significant numbers of Roman Catholics have participated from the beginning along with participants from a range of other Christian traditions—Orthodox, Coptic, Lutheran, Methodist, and Reformed. The theme of the latest seminar held once again in Doha, Qatar, in May of this year was ‘The Community of Believers: Christian and Muslim Perspectives’.

Since its inception, 157 individuals (77 Muslims; 80 Christians) have had the opportunity to participate in the seminars. The attempt to keep the number of Christians and Muslims nearly equal at each gathering has been fairly successful. Participants are not asked to represent a geographical or national constituency; rather they bring their own specialist perspective to the discussion.

The style of the seminars has been described as an exercise in “appreciative conversation” during which one remains rooted in one’s own tradition “whilst at the same time reaching beyond it” engaging in an exchange in which “people listen without judgement, do not seek consensus or compromise, but share the sole purpose of continuing the conversation in order to sustain relationships of mutual respect.” In being so described, ‘appreciative conversation’ has much in common with David Lochhead’s definition of the **dialogical relationship**: that is, a relationship of openness and trust which is clear, unambiguous, and has no other purpose than itself.

Rowan Williams has noted that Building Bridges “was brought into being to fill what was thought to be a gap; a gap not at the diplomatic or political level but a gap of a lack of opportunity for serious, reflective, and fairly loosely-structured encounter between Christian and Muslim scholars.” This seminar series falls into the category of dialogical projects marked by both religious conviction and academic rigour. The Building Bridges style, he says, involves “working together, studying sacred texts together, and above all learning to **listen** to one another … It is a style which has been patient, affirming, and celebrating.”

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8 Rowan Williams, Remarks at dinner to mark the Fifth Building Bridges seminar, *op. cit*.

9 Rowan Williams, Preface to *Prayer, op. cit*.
in progress, as, too, is the German Christian-Muslim Theological Forum to which we now turn.

**Christian-Muslim Theological Forum**

In 2002 a group of young German theologians, interested in fostering a dialogue with Muslim scholars, began a process that led to the founding of the *Theologisches Forum Christentum-Islam*. The lead motivation was to establish a dialogical engagement that was balanced and equal in terms of the level of engagement and the expertise of the interlocutors. The specific goal was to facilitate an academic theological dialogue between Christians and Muslims in the German language on the basis that such dialogue can make an essential contribution to their common life. It was recognised from the outset that such dialogue, if it is to be successful and capable of development, requires an operational and organisational base, and security of continuity. This was gained in having both a committed organisational group and a home-base provided by the Academy of the Catholic Diocese of Rottenburg-Stuttgart. Further, the originating concept was of specialist symposia of invited or registered participants, not open public meetings as such. There was a sense that something had to be carefully nurtured. Thus, whereas Building Bridges began in top-down pomp and fanfare, the German initiative began with a phase of ecumenical, or inner-Christian, conversation and reflection. It grew quietly and steadily from the bottom up.

In the event, two conferences – in 2003 and 2004 – were held with Christian participants only, who had particular interest or speciality in Christian-Muslim relations. The purpose was to enable Christian reflection and discussion about engaging in dialogue with Islam. An ancillary aim was that the Forum should allow younger and new scholars an opportunity to share the results of their research and the Forum was indeed to prove a seed-bed for new and emerging scholarship in the area of Christian-Muslim dialogue as well as the development of Islamic theological scholarship within
the German context. In April 2004 a meeting involving Muslims was held to further develop the concept and programme for an on-going Forum. This resulted in the establishment of a joint Christian-Muslim core group to attend to conference organisation and resultant publications.¹⁰

In March 2005 the first symposium of the Forum proper, involving both Christians and Muslims, was held. From the outset, Christian participation has been fully ecumenical. And although Muslims were in the minority, nevertheless, as numbers of Muslim attendees built up, this too has been reflective of Islamic diversity in Germany. At this first Forum, guiding principles and values – self-critical awareness, multi-perspectival approaches, mutual consultation and learning, the application of interdisciplinary hermeneutical-critical scholarship and interreligious learning and study as the grounding paradigm – were formulated, and the commitment to publish the conference proceedings was made, a commitment that has been consistently honoured. Further, from the outset there was a clear aim to have a broad impact not just through publications, but also in the development of youth interest through an annual study week. Funding support for both the annual conferences and the youth study week programme has been forthcoming from the German Federal Ministry for the Interior. In other words, this form of Christian-Muslim engagement has received political interest and endorsement.

The first Forum had prayer as its theme. The roles of Jesus and Muhammad were explored in relation to the theology and practice of prayer with attention paid to the distinctive differences of the Trinitarian character of Christian prayer on the one hand and the public character of Muslim prayer on the other. The second Forum, in 2006, focussed on identity through knowing boundaries on the basis that identity can never be something static and essentialist, but must rather be dynamic, open and ready for

learning and the processes of change. Identity is forged through concrete interpersonal relationships, and this applies to religious identity as much as to any other form of identity. In 2007, the Forum dealt with the sensitive topic of suffering and pain while the fourth, in 2008, explored the subject of ethics in the two faith traditions. Here opportunity was given to scholars of Christianity and Islam to focus on the rationality of ethics, not in order to subvert the sources of revelation, but to employ methods of rational argument in open discourse so as to provide non-religious reasoning and consideration of the findings of modern natural, social, and human sciences.

Scriptural interpretation in Islam and Christianity was the theme of the fifth conference, in 2009. In both religions there has been a monopoly of interpretations which has displaced contextual hermeneutics and has been rather inclined to misogynistic views. Yet, in both faiths there can be found great variety of interpretation and hermeneutical method, and there are extensive parallels between the Bible and Qur’an. In 2010 the interrelated topics of mission and conversion were addressed. The two virtually classic theological topics of God and Prophethood were the focus, respectively, of the Forum meetings in 2011 and 2012.

From the outset the Forum organizers identified as measures of success of the dialogical enterprise the development of inter-personal friendship between Muslim and Christian participants; the establishment of functional networks of scholars and others; engagement in the dialogue process as equals in the context of an intentional theological mode and level of discourse. To these were added the need for a secure location for meetings and the consistency of core personnel and the structure of the gatherings with the aim of assured outcomes, sound public relations, and the development of appropriate ancillary activities such as the Christian-Muslim study week. On all counts these key indicators have been well met. The impact and success of
this initiative in Christian-Muslim dialogue reaches well beyond the annual gatherings themselves.

**Conclusion**

Contemporary Muslim and Christian intention to engage in fruitful dialogue is clear. Yet the journey into this most critical of interfaith relations is by no means been an easy one; resistance, detraction and criticism from within both religions are constants. At times it seems that the links are fragile and the depth of mutual understanding achieved is rather thin. Pope Benedict’s now infamous Regensburg address, though arguably taken – and so misunderstood – out of context, nevertheless was more than a simple *faux pas*; it was a reminder that the interfaith dimension of Christian–Muslim relations ever requires attention to be paid to the intra-faith challenge of bringing, and keeping, the communities of faith on board. This was where the work of the Building Bridges seminar series and the Christian-Muslim Theological Forum has yet a role to play beyond the value of the dialogical events themselves. They provide worthy models of dialogical engagement and a fund of resources for both scholarly investigation as well as the promotion of dialogical engagement. Such dialogical initiatives as these provide encouragement for the future.
A Comparative Contextualisation of Political Islam in Malaysia & Indonesia: Diverse & Evolving

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This article examines the contemporary diversity and underlying contextual factors shaping political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as its potential future trajectory in those two countries.

Introduction

With a seemingly endless wave of Islamic extremist attacks around the world as well as growing intra-Islamic sectarian violence and, in turn, increasing anti-Islamic sentiment, concern over Islam, especially the rise of ‘political Islam’¹, appears both warranted and unprecedented. Such concern is ranked amongst the top contemporary global security threats by some accounts², including by prominent leaders in the Muslim world such as King Abdullah II of Jordan, a Hashemite and widely considered to be a descendent of Prophet Mohammed, going as far to describe this threat as a “third world war by other means”³. Moreover, such concerns are especially the case in the West where they have dominated the headlines and political and security affairs as well as academia since the Islamic extremist organisation Al-Qaeda

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3 Jordan’s King Abdullah “this is a third world war by other means” Cable News Network, March 1, 2015, accessed, March 2, 2015, [http://cnnpressroomblogs.cnn.com/2015/03/01/jordans-king-abdullah-this-is-a-third-world-war-by-other-means/](http://cnnpressroomblogs.cnn.com/2015/03/01/jordans-king-abdullah-this-is-a-third-world-war-by-other-means/).
carried out the September 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11) against the United States of America (U.S.). Against this backdrop, arguably there has never been a more pressing time in modern history to understand Islam, especially its contemporary political dimensions.\(^4\)

Today much of the Muslim world and, in particular, political Islamic actors appear illiberal, obsessed with hard-line interpretations of ‘Shari’a law’ (Islamic law) and, increasingly, hostile and violent towards the wider world, especially the West and it’s allies.\(^5\) However, closer observation reveals a much wider and diverse political Islamic landscape, including some which, although seemingly a minority, appear to be egalitarian and hence progressive in nature.\(^6\)

Such ideas, moreover, appear neither alien nor new to Islam. Rather, taken in context, such concepts appear to have first emerged during the ‘golden age’ (classical) of the Abbasid Caliphate which ruled the Islamic Caliphate/empire between the late-8\(^{th}\) and mid-13\(^{th}\) Centuries.\(^7\) This especially appears to be the case during the 9\(^{th}\) Century during which the Abbasid’s promoted a rational and hence scientific approach to the jurisprudential interpretation (‘ijtihad’) and therefore application of Islamic teachings (Quran) and practises (Sunnah/hadiths).\(^8\) These teachings and practises were stipulated by Prophet Mohammad in the 7\(^{th}\) Century and addressed, among other matters, state affairs, including politics, law, and economics.\(^9\) Influenced heavily


\(^5\) Ibid.


\(^8\) Ibid, 293, 275-276
classical Greco-Hellenistic rationalism, especially by such renowned philosophers as Plato and Aristotle, such an approach was at the cornerstone of the ‘Mu'tazilah’ school of Islam which flourished during the 9th and early-10th Centuries; undoubtedly the most liberal of its day. Therefore, the Mu'tazilah school of Islamic thought arguably represents the foundations on which a liberal tradition emerged within Islam, influencing politics and hence political Islam which continues to this day, be it a minority one nonetheless. This appears to be the case in Malaysia and Indonesia, countries with long histories of political Islamic actors and polities alike, especially following their independence.

Through a qualitative comparative analysis this study, therefore, examines the contemporary diversity and underlying contextual factors shaping political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as its potential future trajectory in those two countries. Arguing that while radical (‘Islamist’) and extremist (‘Jihadist’) forms present real and on-going challenges and threats, however, contrary to much mainstream literature published on the subject, political Islam, at least in Malaysia and Indonesia, is neither inherently radical nor extremist. Rather, appearing to consist

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10 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, 34-35; Kung, Islam, 296.

11 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, 34-35.


13 The term Islamist/Islamism (also referred to as ‘Salafist/Salafism’) refers to a particular form of political Islamic ideology that has broken from ‘traditional’ Islam. Advocating in its stead an ultra-puritanical, draconian, literalist, and, in some cases, violent/extremist interpretation of Islamic teachings (Quran) and practices (Sunnah/Hadiths) which purport to embody ‘true’ Islam as it was during the time of Prophet Mohammad and the first four ‘rightly guided’ Caliphs/rulers; thus the original Islamic ‘umma’ (community) in the 7th Century CE who were known as the ‘salaf al-salih’ (righteous ancestors of Islam). See: Roel Meijer, (2010) “Salafism: Doctrine, Diversity and Practice”, Political Islam: Context Versus Ideology, Khaled Hroub (Ed.), (London: London Middle East Institute at SOAS, 2010), 37-60.

of a wide range of actors and polities, some of which appear egalitarian in nature, albeit appearing to be a minority. Analysis concludes, moreover, this contemporary and evolving diversity to be fundamentally linked to improving, be it slow in some cases, socio-economic and wider contextual societal conditions which have been developing in those two countries, especially in the wake of ‘modernisation’. However, such developments appear to ‘cut both ways’, thus also catalysis for radicalisation and extremism in some cases.

**Political Islam in post-Independence Malaysia & Indonesia**

Since their independence, and especially since the 1970s, Malaysia and, particularly following democratisation in 1998, Indonesia experienced a rise in political Islam, including Islamist and Jihadist manifestations. While not exclusive to these two countries and time period, some Islamists in Malaysia and Indonesia have forged links with transnational Islamist groups. Shifting and amalgamating their local agendas with international ones with groups such as, among others, the Jordan-based Hizb ut-Tahrir which has branches in Malaysia and Indonesia and seeks to establish an international Caliphate. Additionally, though a minority, extremists from these two countries have increasingly sought to join transnational Jihadist organisations including Al-Qaeda and, most recently, the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS); estimated to have some 350 fighters within its ranks from Indonesia alone. Moreover, Malaysia and Indonesia are home to such Jihadist

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16 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, 52.

groups as, among others, Kumpulan Militant Malaysia, Jemaah Islamiyah and Al-Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago, as well as many more Islamist actors, both state and non-state. These include the Islamic Defenders Front (IDF) and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia and the Malaysian Muslim Solidarity (ISMA) and pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) among others\(^\text{18}\).

However, as noted by Barry Desker in his 2003 work *Islam in Southeast Asia: The Challenge of Radical Interpretations*, and by Greg Barton in his 2004 work *Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam*, there also appears to be non-Islamist and, in particular, non-Jihadist strands of political Islam active in some parts of Southeast Asia\(^\text{19}\). These appear to include political Islamic parties in both Malaysia and Indonesia.

In Malaysia such forms of political Islam appear manifest in the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition party (BN – aka the National Front – founded in 1946) led by Malaysian PM, Najib Tun Razak; United Malays National Organisation (UMNO, the PM’s party – 1973); Pan-Malaysian Islamic Front (BERJASA – 1977); Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress (KIMMA – 1977); and the People’s Justice Party (PKR – 2003) which has its roots in the Muslim Community Union of Malaysia (IKATAN)\(^\text{20}\).

In Indonesia too, the largest Muslim majority nation and third largest democracy in the world after the U.S. and India respectively, such groups include: United Development Party (PPP – 1973); National Mandate Party (PAN – 1998); National

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\(^\text{18}\) For a detailed discussion on Islamist and Jihadist groups in Malaysia and Indonesia see: Liow, “Malaysia”, 89-100; Abuza, *Political Islam And Violence In Indonesia*.


Awakening Party (PKB – 1998); and Reform Star Party (PBR – 2002)\textsuperscript{21}. All of these political organisations are best identified as ‘moderate’, belonging somewhere between ‘progressive’ (aka ‘pluralist’ or ‘liberal’) and ‘conservative’ (aka ‘traditionalist’ or ‘fundamentalist’) on the spectrum of political Islam, rather than Islamist, and especially not Jihadist\textsuperscript{22}.

Although not monolithic, and while some appear to manifest pockets sympathetic to Islamism such as the PPP and PAN in Indonesia and the UMNO in Malaysia, nevertheless, at the heart of their political ideologies and hence objectives they appear to be concerned with institutionalising Islamic values and laws (Shari’a law) in a mainly modern and symbolic context\textsuperscript{23}. For conservatives, such as the UMNO, this appears to be concerned with two key dimensions: First, a ‘societal’ dimension, concerned with upholding traditional Islamic values and laws within society in the wake of ongoing modernisation\textsuperscript{24} and, secondly, ‘state-power’ – and thus “an instrument for maintaining state-based regulatory power and social control”\textsuperscript{25}.

While societal concerns and state-power are factors, progressive forms of political Islam such as the PKR, however, appear to be essentially concerned with ‘structural’ development and hence modernisation of the state and wider society through a liberal pluralistic Islamic polity\textsuperscript{26}. Therefore, unlike conservatives, and especially Islamists and Jihadists, progressive political Islam essentially appears to be a product of, rather


\textsuperscript{22} Kurniawati, “Are Islamic Parties in Indonesia Elections 2014 Growing”; Barton, \textit{Indonesia’s Struggle}, 72.


\textsuperscript{24} Sidel, \textit{The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia}, 18, 40.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, 43.

\textsuperscript{26} Liow, “Malaysia”, 94.
than a reaction to, modernity, not a tool for political and social control. By contrast, progressive forms of political Islam place importance on socio-economic development, higher-education, social-justice, social-welfare, pluralism, as well as political and institutional democratisation.27

Modernity & the Shifting Dynamics of Contemporary Political Islam in Malaysia & Indonesia

Throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s, and particularly as a result of increased international ‘Islamisation’ efforts by both non-state and state actors, including from nations such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran,28 support for conservative and, in particular, Islamist, as well as Jihadist, strands of political Islam grew in Malaysia and Indonesia, while remaining a significant force throughout the 2000s. In turn, support for strict Shari’a law also increased.29

This has been the case in Aceh, Indonesia where compliance with strict Shari’a law became mandatory for non-Muslims, as well as Muslims in 2013. In turn, this extended the harsh Islamic ‘hudud’ penal code to some 90,000 non-Muslims which was officially implemented in that region in 2001.30 In Malaysia, where Islam is enshrined in the constitution, and Shari’a law parallels the civil judicial system through Shari’a Courts, there are growing calls amongst Islamists and extremists for the extension of Shari’a law in that country. They call for its application to apply to

27 Desker, “Islam in Southeast Asia”, 420; Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, 28, 32; Liow, “Malaysia”, 94.


29 Liow, “Malaysia”, 89-100; Sidel, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia, 40; Abuza, Political Islam And Violence In Indonesia, 84-85.

both Muslim and non-Muslim populations, as well as the institutionalisation of the hudud penal code\textsuperscript{31}.

However, as noted by prominent scholars such as Joseph Liow and John T. Sidel, this has fundamentally been a reaction to modernity, “rather than signs of an Islamist trend itself.”\textsuperscript{32} Hence, during this period Malaysia and Indonesia underwent rapid economic growth, industrialisation and urbanisation, and saw increased emphasis placed on higher-education as well as significant social and, especially in Indonesia, political liberalisation (democratisation). Such developments are viewed by Islamists, and especially Jihadists, and also – though to a lesser extent – conservatives, as a threat to Islam’s role in society\textsuperscript{33}.

As Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s economies continue to grow, with an estimated GDP of 4.7\% and 5.2\% in 2015 respectively, forecast to rise in 2016 and 2017\textsuperscript{34}, and with Indonesia’s economy estimated to be the seventh largest in the world by 2030, therefore, there is consequently a rapidly expanding ‘middle-class’ which will arguably continue to drive wider societal modernisation in both countries\textsuperscript{35}. These developments thus far appear to have limited ‘political space’ and support for Islamism in Malaysia and Indonesia, resulting in stagnation if not decline, especially

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since the early-to-mid-2000s. This is seemingly the case despite a spike in Islamist violence and extremism throughout this period, especially in Indonesia. Moreover, the findings in the 2013 report by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) in Jakarta, Indonesia, Weak, Therefore Violent: The Mujahidin of Western Indonesia, indicates ‘weakness’ rather than ‘strength’ attributed to this increase. Therefore, collectively these contextual factors hold key insight into the strength and trajectory of political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia.

Conversely, these conditions appear to be key catalysts underpinning the rise of more progressive strands of political Islam, including the PKB in Indonesia and the PKR in Malaysia. This has especially been the case in the post-9/11 era as both states increased efforts to curve Islamic extremism. Additionally, these conditions appear to have given rise to ‘pro-modernity’ Muslim civil society groups, including the Madjjid’s Paramadina Foundation and the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal) in Indonesia as well as the Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF) and Sisters in Islam (SIS) in Malaysia. However, the rise of progressive political Islam and pro-modernity civil society groups appear to have also generated a backlash amongst some conservative and, especially, Islamists, while emboldening extremists. A development highlighted in Indonesia by Greg Fealy in his 2006 work A Conservative Turn: Liberal Islamic groups have promoted a backlash.

36 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, 72-73; Sidel, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia, 39-41.
Paradoxically, it appears that these conditions have also moderated and or limited the appeal of Islamists in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Hence, PAS – the largest ‘mainstream’ Islamist party in Malaysia established in 1951 by a breakaway faction from the UMNO\textsuperscript{42} – announced in June 2010 in the build-up to the 2013 Malaysian general elections that it was putting forward non-Muslim candidates in an effort to broaden its appeal and hence membership to non-Muslims\textsuperscript{43}. However, such a development appears to be ‘strategic electioneering’, and thus simply a shift in strategy/tactics rather than evidence of any moderation in ideology and objectives; a strategy that has long been employed by the PAS\textsuperscript{44}. Nevertheless, this development appears to indicate the limited and or declining appeal and hence support for Islamism in Malaysia, at least for the PAS.

Although remaining the dominant Islamist party in Malaysia, the PAS moreover appears to have stagnated since it peaked as a political force in 1999. It won 27 of the 222 parliamentary seats in the 1999 general elections, only 7 in 2004, then 23 in 2008, and 21 in 2013. In comparison, support for the main conservative political Islamic party, the UMNO, remained consistently strong: It won 71 seats in 1999, 109 in 2004, 79 in 2008, and 88 in 2013. While the main progressive political Islamic party, PKR, an opposition coalition party, débuted in the 2004 elections wining 1 seat, it then mushroomed to 31 seats in 2008 and 30 seats in the 2013 elections\textsuperscript{45}.

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\textsuperscript{41} Greg Fealy, “A conservative turn: Liberal Islamic groups have promoted a backlash”, \textit{Inside Indonesia}, July-September, 2006, accessed February 1, 2015, \url{http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles/a-conservative-turn}.

\textsuperscript{42} Liow, “Malaysia”, 90.


\textsuperscript{44} Liow, “Malaysia”, 95.

\textsuperscript{45} A full breakdown of Malaysia’s general elections can be obtained through the official Election Commission of Malaysia: \url{http://spr.gov.my/}. 

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In Indonesia where Islamism remains a formidable force, there too appears to have been limited support for mainstream Islamist political parties in the wake of that country’s transition to democracy in 1998. This is evident in respect to the two largest Islamist parties: the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS – formally the PK: renamed in 2003) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB). The PKS won 1.4% of the overall vote in the 1999 Indonesian legislative elections, 7.2% in 2004, 7.9% in 2009, and 6.8% in 2014. In the same elections the PBB received 1.9%, 2.6%, 1.8%, and 1.4%, respectively. In comparison, progressive and conservative political Islamic parties fared much better. The PKB received 12.6%, 10.6%, 4.9%, and 9%, of the overall vote in each election respectively, and the PAN received 7.1%, 6.4%, 6%, and 7.5%, respectively. While the PPP received 10.7%, 8.2%, 5.3%, and 6.5% respectively. The PBR won 2.8% in 2004 and 1.2% in 2009 (PBR did not contest the 2014 elections). Collectively, these results arguably indicate an overall decline, or at best stagnation, in support for Islamists while, on the other hand, a mixture of increased, or, at worst, sustained support for the bulk of conservative and progressive forms of political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia. In particular, the PKR and the UMNO in Malaysia and, especially in the wake of the 2014 elections, the PKB in Indonesia have seen significant increases in support. Moreover, the PKB played a key role in the 2014 Presidential Elections which saw Joko Widodo, seen as a ‘reformist’, become the first President of Indonesia who is not from the ruling elite and the ‘old guard’ of former President Suharto’s New Order legacy.

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46 A full breakdown of Indonesia’s general elections can be obtained through the official General Elections Commission: http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=41. Also see: Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, 72-73; Kurniawati, “Are Islamic Parties in Indonesia Elections 2014 Growing”.


24
Looking Ahead: A Prognosis of Political Islam in Malaysia & Indonesia

Though not exclusive, political and socio-economic conditions, as well as civil society are key contextual forces, and hence variables/factors, shaping political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia. Arguably they will remain the primary contextual factors that will ultimately determine the future trajectory of political Islam in both countries.

While it appears these factors will increasingly generate conditions favourable to progressive and conservative strands of political Islam, however, Islamism will remain a significant force and, especially in the context of Jihadists, a major security challenge in Malaysia and Indonesia in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, analysis indicates extremists will increasingly find themselves isolated while Islamists will be forced to adapt and or reinvent themselves in the face of inevitably changing socio-economic and political conditions. This will be especially necessary in order to compete with conservative and more progressive strands of political Islam, and hence increase their support-base and, for some, to survive. However, any such political moves could potentially isolate their ‘core’ support-base and thus risk political fragmentation or implosion.

While these developments potentially are a cause for some optimism, especially in terms of limiting the appeal and therefore support for Islamism in Malaysia and Indonesia, it also presents potential challenges. One such challenge linked to the impact of modernisation appears to be an increase in competition between different strands of political Islam, especially over who represents ‘true’ Islam. This has generated an evolution in strategies/tactics between the different strands of political Islam.

indonesia-election-idUSBREA4A02Q20140511: Wilson, “Indonesia’s vote for Jokowi also a vote for democracy”.
Islam, resulting in a ‘blurring of lines’ between ideologies and objectives, especially between conservatives and Islamists\(^49\).

This development appeared evident in the run-up to the 2013 elections in Malaysia. Hence, during the election campaign the UMNO shifted towards a more fundamentalist endorsement of Islam and its application in society so not to be seen as being too ‘moderate’ amongst the predominantly conservative Muslim population. Consequently, this appears to have resulted in increased emphasis being placed on puritanical and draconian interpretations of Shari’a within Malaysian society, including the hudud penal code\(^50\). The PAS sought to present itself as less of an Islamist party in an effort to also appeal to conservative voters. Therefore, these competitive strategic/tactical moves by both the UMNO and PAS ultimately sought to capture votes away from the other, rather than signalling shifts in ideology and objectives; a strategy/tactic that has long defined the UMNO-PAS relationship\(^51\).

Additionally, shifting socio-economic and political conditions, coupled with rising support for more progressive forms of political Islam as well as pro-modernity civil society groups, could, as indicated by the IPAC and Greg Fealy’s reports, increase acts of political violence\(^52\). Such developments could add to the pool of isolated, disenfranchised and weakened Islamists. In turn, this could potentially add to the pool, though a much weaker one than a decade ago, of extremists and hence Jihadists active in both Indonesia and Malaysia.


\(^{51}\) Liow, “Malaysia”, 95.

\(^{52}\) “Weak, Therefore Violent”; Fealy, “A conservative turn”. 

26
Conclusion

This paper has examined the contemporary diversity and emerging nature of political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as the underlying contextual forces impacting its development in those two countries. I have identified and argued that in addition to Islamist and Jihadist manifestations there is also a wide range of actors and allied polities which are conservative and progressive in nature active throughout Malaysia and Indonesia; thus rebuffing claims that political Islam is inherently radical and extremist in make-up.

I suggest, moreover, that improving socio-economic, political and civil societal conditions are key ‘multiplying’ contextual forces that will increasingly impact and shape the rise of moderate forms of political Islam, especially progressive ones, in Malaysia and Indonesia. Further, Islamists in both countries will increasingly be forced to adapt and hence ‘moderate’ in the face of inevitable societal progression as a result of intensifying modernisation in order to sustain and, especially, increase their support-bases, while Jihadists will increasingly be isolated. This will result in increased competition as well as shifts in tactics, strategies and, potentially, ideology and objectives, and likely a rise in support for conservative and progressive strands of political Islam. However, modernisation, at least in the short-to-mid term, should be seen as cutting both ways, a development that will increasingly generate moderation within political Islam, as well as some likely ‘back-lashes’ and thus some radicalisation and extremism in the foreseeable future in both countries.

Additionally, this study contributes to the ‘theory building’ process on the study of political Islam in two notable areas. First, it can be deduced from the analysis that key contextual ‘generative mechanisms’ identified as shaping the diversity within political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia arguably provide important indicators through which
to forecast the trajectory of political Islam in other societies, especially Muslim majority nations.

Secondly, it can be ascertained that while political Islam has been on the rise during the post-independence periods of Malaysia and Indonesia, especially since the 1970s, as well as globally, it is not a ‘modern’ phenomenon. Rather, my analysis indicates that political Islamic actors and allied polities of one form or another appear to extend back to at least the ‘classical’ period of the Islamic tradition and hence civilisation, during which, in the context of the day, they arguably included liberal and therefore progressive actors and allied polities. Thus political Islam appears not to be a ‘product’ of modernity per se, although significantly impacted by it, as indicated by much literature on this subject. Rather, like all religious-inspired civilisations, political Islam has been an indispensable ‘real world’ tool through which to administer, as seen by Muslims, ‘divine’ law (Shari’a) over the ‘worldly’. Over time, this has evolved as well as mutated, being impacted by ‘internal’ and ‘external’ contextual factors as well as history, and has been employed by state – traditionally the Caliph/Islamic ruler – and, increasingly, non-state actors alike. In Malaysia and Indonesia, this has generated some progressive as well as conservative manifestations and, in the context of Islamists and Jihadists, appears to have transcended if not reduced both the religious and political dimensions of ‘traditional’ Islam to a draconian and extremist doctrine respectively.
Mostly Harmless: A Short History of the First Century of Muslim Settlement in New Zealand

Abdullah Drury

Abdullah Drury is a University of Waikato MPhil candidate with the Philosophy and Religious Studies Programme and is researching the history of New Zealand’s South Island Muslim community. He is also the author of *Islam in New Zealand: A Short History of the New Zealand Muslim Association* and has reviewed a wide range of books on the subject of Islam with many appearing in the international journal *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*.

The notion of Muslim immigration to, and settlement in, New Zealand has become synonymous with the inflow of Asian and more recently African immigrants and refugees. However, in reality a significant number of Muslim migrants have been arriving and working in this country since the 1850s. This paper surveys the immigration of a myriad of individuals and their families over the first century of Muslim settlement in New Zealand, and frames the stages that led to the creation of the first Islamic institutions and organisations. Although their presence and contribution to New Zealand history has been largely forgotten, the facts acquired are very instructive and reveal much about the broader Muslim immigrant experience that have not been widely articulated in mainstream New Zealand historical accounts.

Introduction

The intention of this essay is to outline a short history of the first century of the Muslim minority in New Zealand, from the earliest recorded evidence to the 1970s. The Islamic community presently numbers approximately 40,000¹ and is extremely diverse in character, race, employment, education and geographic spread – making accurate generalisations about current affairs and the salient details of such a diffuse group increasingly oblique. I intend to focus on the earlier, less explored aspects of the past as many scholars have assumed or pronounced it near to impossible to write an interesting history of the first century of Muslim settlement in this land. According to this assessment there is insufficient material available to reveal anything truly personal or to make generalisations about specific characteristics, and not enough extant documentation for a proper modern academic analysis. However I believe we can demonstrate otherwise: what is not recorded about the religious dispositions and

pragmatic ambivalence of the myriad of identified Muslim pioneers is perhaps as significant as what was. In fact textual ambiguities and tensions throw up a surprising amount of pertinent data, and these seemingly irreconcilable contradictions and complexities add yet more richness to our understanding of the history of Islam in New Zealand.

**Genesis**

For a long time the date of the 1874 government census (when 17 “Mahometans” were identified) was bandied about as the start of a Muslim presence in New Zealand. However my recent research has revealed a Muslim family resident in Canterbury from the 1850s onwards.

The first identifiable Muslim to settle in New Zealand permanently appears to be one Mahomet Wuzerah or Wuzerah Moosalman, commonly known as Wuzerah (and spelling variations on that single name). He seems to have arrived in the employ of Sir John Cracroft Wilson (1808 – 1881), who came to Lyttleton in 1854 on a ship named the Akbar and bought land on the Canterbury Plains, at the lower hills and the swamp at the southern base of the Port Hills. Wilson named the property Cashmere after the real Kashmir in India. In any event the year 1858 saw the first Muslim in New Zealand in a court case.

“The case which occupied the Court to-day was an action brought against one Goorden, a native of India, by Wuzeera another Indian, for a robbery of some money from the house of the latter on the 27th of September last. Both were servants of Mr. Wilson, of Cashmere. Both parties being ignorant of the English language, Mr. P. Ashton acted as interpreter, and the witnesses

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Wuzeera and his wife were sworn upon the Koran (English translation) and repeated the Mahometan formula and genuflexions of a solemn oath.\textsuperscript{3}

Wuzerah was not alone. As noted in the newspaper article above he had a wife named Mindia and two sons Pero and Mero (born in India, presumably in the 1850s). Two more boys - Noora and Rabbi - were born at Cashmere about 1859 and 1861 respectively. The first record of Muslims resident in New Zealand according to the government census was in 1861 when four “Mahometans” were recorded: presumably this was Wuzerah and family.\textsuperscript{4}

Curiously “Wazera Noora” was later involved in horse breeding and by the 1890s was selling trotting stallions in Otago.\textsuperscript{5} There were a series of court cases involving the family throughout the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, and an inquest when one son drowned, providing historians with documents that give a rare (if lopsided) insight into the family dynamics.\textsuperscript{6}

The 1 May 1902 edition of the newspaper \textit{Star} outlines an obituary for Wuzerah but inexplicably calls him “Bezire” - a bullock driver who in the 1870s, brought down stone for Christchurch Cathedral from a Port Hills quarry. Early interfaith activity or a work opportunity? Certainly it may be a surprise to many to learn of the contribution of an early Muslim settler to the construction of perhaps New Zealand’s most iconic symbol of Christian faith! Wuzerah's death, from heart disease, at the Cashmere

\textsuperscript{3}“Supreme Court Lyttelton” in \textit{Lyttelton Times (LT)}, 13 March 1858, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{4}“Statistics of New Zealand for 1861, including the results of a Census of the Colony, taken on the 16th of December in that year” (Auckland), 1861, Number 13.
\textsuperscript{5}“The Metropolitan Show” in \textit{The Press (Press)}, 11 November 1893, p. 9; “Advertisements” (Column Two), \textit{The Otago Daily Times (ODT)}, 24 November 1893, p. 4.
property, with Mero finding the body, was reported in some detail in the Christchurch Star and, in more abbreviated form, in newspapers in other centres. An Indian Muslim living and dying in New Zealand was, clearly, a matter of some interest to the general public of colonial New Zealand and the obituary was repeated in newspapers as far away as Auckland, Otago and Wanganui. The Sydenham Cemetery burial book has Wuzerah listed as a 'pensioner' of the Cracroft Wilson family and the newspapers estimated his age at death as being anywhere between 80 to 100.

Wuzerah’s son “Mero Wiggers” died in 1927, aged 75, a labourer of Drain Road, Halswell. His brother Noah Wizero, a labourer of Hoon Hay, was buried on 25 September 1928 in the same plot. Christchurch born Rabbi, also known as Robert Wazero, worked as a farm labourer and lived on Cashmere Road. He died, aged 79, on 21 March 1941 and was buried in Block 29A Plot 33 at the Sydenham Cemetery.

Ultimately Wuzerah’s precise identity is vague and even his full name is fairly nebulous.

Indians

In 1871 a solitary “Mussulman” was identified in the regional census for Otago. This is almost certainly Mahomet Khan, the earliest identifiable Muslim resident in Otago, who secured employment in the goldfields at Kyeburn around 1869. His surname indicates an Indian origin but he did not stay long and nothing more is


8 Press, 24 October 1927, p. 15.

9 Press, 26 September 1928, p. 17.

10 “WAZERO Robert - Christchurch - Retired Farm Lab” R20190161, CAHX, Series 2989, CH17, Box 387, Number CH1235/1941, Archives New Zealand.

known of him. The April 1874 the government census recorded 15 Chinese “Mahometan” goldminers living in Dunstan, Otago. Two more Muslims were resident in Auckland and Dunedin. From the 1890s and 1900s Indian men from the Punjab and Gujarat started settling here permanently in increasing numbers, sometime marrying local women, mostly Pakeha. Curiously enough one of the first identifiable Muslims living in Dunedin in the 1870s was “Butterdean” (Badruddin presumably) “a Mahommedan, born in Cashmere”. We know little of the rest of his palliament but in 1875 he was described as having “recently arrived in this Province” and was “wearing the turban in court” as a witness.

Two other Muslims turned up in interesting Dunedin court cases in the 1890s, most probably hawkers: Abdul Borham (Burhan?) and Soloman (Suleman?) Shah who both seem to have hailed from Bengal in eastern India. In 1893 “Borham” was involved in a court case with another hawker in Dunedin. A contemporary report in the Christchurch Press simply call him and Charles Abraham “Assyrians” although the Christchurch Star presented Shah as “an Indian hawker”. Unhelpfully an earlier account in the Otago Daily Times simply called both Shah and Abdul Boreham “two Hindoos”. Shah was working in Christchurch by 1898 but that year the police had arrested him and escorted his person back to Dunedin for failing to support his two illegitimate children by Isabella McGuire (Solomon McGuire in 1896 and Robert

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13 “Results of a Census of the Colony of New Zealand taken for the Night of the 1st of March, 1874” (Wellington, 1875), pp. 56-57.
14 “RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT”, ODT, 24 June 1875, p. 3. ; See also “The Otago Daily Times”, ODT, 24 June 1875, p. 2.
15 “RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT”, ODT, 4 November 1893, p. 3.
17 THE ICE-CREAM VENDOR”, Star, 7 April 1902, p. 3.
18 “RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT”, ODT, 4 November 1893, p. 3.
Gordon McGuire in 1897). He was defended by reputed lawyer Alfred Charles Hanlon (1866 – 1944). Shah later married Ms McGuire and a daughter was born, but he died in Christchurch on 16 December 1909.

The 1900s saw a small influx of Punjabi Muslim settlers. One of the earliest and easily the most controversial was Abraham Walley Mahomed Salaman, more probably Ibrahim Wali Mohammed Suleman (1885-1941). Salaman was born in Amritsar, gained little proper education and left India when 14 years old. In one of his many court cases he claimed to have studied dye production in Germany.19 “The first of the identifiable Punjabi Muslims to reach New Zealand”20 he arrived around 1903 according to Professor McLeod and most sources, although in a 1921 court case he stated 1912.21 By 1914 he was a silk merchant in Auckland. The following year he moved to Wellington in December married an 18-year-old Scottish-born Marjory Cardno.22 Their daughter was born in 1917 but the relationship was tumultuous. In a 1918 court case over financial support Salaman alleged she drank alcohol and “declared that an Indian named Khan had told him that his wife had been out with him in the Basin Reserve at ten o’clock at night.”23 Taj Mohammed Khan was a Punjabi Indian “bottle yardsman”24 resident in Tory Place when balloted for army service in 1918. He is known to us through his periodic court appearances in Auckland and Wellington for drunk and disorderly offenses. An “Indian and a discharged soldier”25

19 “THEIR TROUBLES”, NZ Truth (NZT), 11 May 1918, p. 5.
21 “A HABEAS CORUPUS CONUNDRUM”, NZT, 24 December 1921, p. 5.
23 “THEIR TROUBLES”, NZT, 11 May 1918, p. 5.
24 “DRAWN FOR SERVICE”, The Dominion (DOM), 25 April 1918, p. 4.
(Khan successfully appealed his ballot, before changing his mind and trying to rescind his appeal – this time unsuccessfully.\textsuperscript{26})

Curiously in a 1921 court case “Salaman denied that he had tried to teach his wife to be a Mahommedan. The religion of Mahomet and the Congregational are nearly the same, he explained sweetly, only the Mahommedan religion is rather more strict. He did not try to teach her, but she tried to learn it.”\textsuperscript{27} Salaman started manufacturing aniline dyes and was contracted to provide the khaki dye used for soldiers’ uniforms during the war. The couple divorced in June 1922 and Salaman returned to Auckland where he remarried and opened a business as a herbalist in Khyber Pass Road. Possessing no formal qualifications he rapidly became involved in more court cases and inquests when customers died and even served a short period in jail.\textsuperscript{28} Salaman appears to have been a personal target of the popular newspaper “NZ Truth”. In 1916 they described him as a “sooty-colored Hindoo” and “Oriental brudder”\textsuperscript{29}, in 1918 a “dark-hued Syrian” and “dusky hubby”\textsuperscript{30}, in 1921 a “dusky seducer”\textsuperscript{31}, and in 1922 declared “…the coon in question has been judged …a fraud.”\textsuperscript{32} By 1930 Salaman had relocated to New Plymouth. In 1940 he had a miniature Moghul style tomb (complete with a brass star and crescent moon on top of a blue dome) built for himself inside the Te Henui cemetery that occupied 10 plots and required special permission. Salaman died on 8 February 1941 and his body was embalmed, lying in state for a week, whilst robed in a silver-patterned green wrap over a white satin gown. On 15 February over

\textsuperscript{27} “A HABEAS CORPUS CONUNDRUM”, NZT, 24 December 1921, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{28} “Herbalist and Patient”, The Waikato Times (WT), 3 December 1924, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{29} “MAHOMET’S "MISSUS”, NZT, 15 July 1916, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{30} “THEIR TROUBLES”, NZT, 11 May 1918, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{31} “A HABEAS CORPUS CONUNDRUM”, NZT, 24 December 1921, p. 5
\textsuperscript{32} “AN INDIAN IMPOSTER?”, NZT, 4 November 1922, p. 6.
2,000 people gathered at the cemetery for the service, led by a Presbyterian Minister named J. D. Wilson and conducted in both English and Arabic. An adroit businessman Salaman’s estate was valued at nearly £8,000 at his death.\footnote{Louise Buckingham, “Salaman, Abraham Walley Mahomed”, \textit{The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography}, Volume 4, 1921-1940, (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1998), pp. 447-448.; See also : Lay, Graeme, “Salaman’s Tomb” in \textit{Epitaph II} (Random House, 2001), pp. 200-207; Bishop, Martin, “A History of the Muslim Community in New Zealand to 1980”, a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of M.A. in history at the University of Waikato (Waikato University, 1997), pp. 87-88.; James Morton and Susanna Lobez also have an interesting chapter analysing the drama entitled “Physician Heal Thyself” in their book \textit{King of Stings} (Victory Books, 2011), pp. 121-147.}

Perhaps the earliest identifiable Punjabi Muslim settler in the South Island was Sheikh Mohammed Din (1877-1945) from Sialkote, born to Fazal Din, a farmer and merchant. In 1904 W. T. Glasgow, Secretary and Inspector at the Customs Department in Wellington gave Sheikh Mahommed Din permission to enter the Colony provided a certain Mr. Devereux gave a written guarantee that Din would leave with a Mrs Kempthorne within one month of his arrival.\footnote{“W T Glasgow, Secretary and Inspector, Customs Department, Wellington - Sheik Mahomet” R16232895, BBAO, Series 5544, A78, Box 215 / a, Number 1904 / 1242, Archives New Zealand.} He didn’t. Within months of his arrival he was the store manager of Pannells Ltd on Lavoud Street in Akaroa and by the end of that same year he was married and for all intents and purposes, settled. His career was a curious one with many ups and downs, bankruptcies and court cases, one divorce and one marital separation. The NZ Truth, ever a bastion of enlightened reporting, even ran an article about his woes in 1923 entitled “MIXED MARRIAGE MUDDLE”.\footnote{“MIXED MARRIAGE MUDDLE”, \textit{NZT}, 28 July 1923, p. 5.} Din drowned in what can only politely be described as obscure circumstances near his shop in the Chatham Islands in July 1945.\footnote{“DIN Sheikh Mohammad” R23140348, AAOM, Series 6030, Box 183, 17231, Archives New Zealand.} His son Laurence “was suddenly anxious to show solicitude towards his father’s body and ordered a coffin suitable to send back to Mecca, as befitted a good
Moslem.” \(^{37}\) Ultimately however the coffin and corpse were transported to the Bromley Crematorium in Christchurch and cremated on 24 July 1945. For reasons that are entirely unclear (although presumably the word economy is involved), his ashes were interred at the Waikumete cemetery in Auckland in 1948. \(^{38}\)

Others …..

The first identifiable Turkmenistani family in Christchurch was that of Sali (or more probably Saleh) Mahomet. According to his descendants Sali Mahomet was born Mohammed Khan in Ashkhabad. The family fled the Russian invasion in the 19th century but the women folk died crossing Afghanistan into British India. Father and son, Sultan and Sali, found their way to Australia and then arrived at Bluff in December 1896. \(^{39}\) They traded as hawkers throughout Otago and the West Coast before settling in Christchurch in 1903 after Sali injured a leg. Sultan Mahomet, an “old Assyrian” \(^{40}\) according to the newspapers, died and was buried in December 1905. At the same time Sali established a business selling ice cream from a bright red and white cart in the south east corner of Cathedral Square. He married a Pakeha lady the following year - Florence Henrietta Johnstone from Omakau in Otago \(^{41}\) - and they had four daughters, notorious city beauties.

“On his marriage certificate, Sali gave his birthplace as Ceylon and, elsewhere, he said that he was a Punjabi. He may have decided that, when

\(^{37}\) Te Miria Kate Wills Johnson, The People of the Chathams, True Tales of the Islanders Early Days (GWJ Publications, 1994).


\(^{41}\) “MARRIAGES”, Star, 6 January 1906, p. 5.
living in a country that was proud to be part of the British Empire, it was best to claim that one had been born within the bounds of that empire.”

As he was fluent in Arabic, Russian, German and Punjabi, his services were used as court interpreter from time to time when passing sailors landed on the wrong side of the law. His friendly personality, jovial mood and willingness to help others earned him the affections of Christchurch citizenry and he gained the nickname “Ice cream Charlie”. (Charlie, presumably being an Anglicisation of Saleh). In April 1943 Sali entered the Old Men’s Home, Ashburton, and there, on 7 October, succumbed to a second stroke. He was buried, with Sultan, in the Linwood cemetery.”

Sali Mahomet remains something of an enigma. The first Muslim refugee to New Zealand? Certainly the first Turkestani. His biographer Richard Greenaway of the Christchurch Library writes convincingly that Sali Mahomet was absolutely “devoted to his wife…..Loving and indulgent to his daughters, he also encouraged them to gain as much as possible from their education.” It is hard to imagine a better epithet.

The first Slavic Muslims to visit appear to have been O. and Salko (Salih) Hadžiahmetović (variant spellings) who arrived in November 1904 with Dalmatian gum-diggers on the SS Zealandia. It is not entirely clear who these men were as we do not have a simple list of the entire party or specific arrival and departure dates, although these two men were identified as “Armenians” by the official who wrote up the passenger list. By 1907 it seems there was a group of 13 “Hercegovinians of Mohamedan religion” in Maropiu, north of Dargaville in Northland, led by one

43 Greenaway, p. 43.
44 Greenaway, p. 43.
Mustafa Fetahagich. According to the National Archives card-indexed list of kauri gum license registers on 14 December 1904 Lahir Hadgovic (most probably Hadzovic) was granted a one year license to dig for gum in the Aratipu Riding, south of Dargaville. He was joined six months later on 15 June 1905 by fellow Slavic Muslims Zaim Budalica, Ahmet Falajic, Osman Felajic, Ahmet Galujativic (most probably Galijatovic), and O. and Salko Hadžiahmetović. The following year Mustappa Fetagovich (Mustafa Fetahagich), Ahmet Fetagovich, Avdo (Abduh) Fetagovich and Ahmet Galyatovic (Galijatovic), worked licences at the Kaihu Riding. Ahmet, and O. and Salko Hadžiahmetović also secured licenses to work at Kaihu Riding on 2 March 1907. To date research has produced no further information. It is uncertain when the rest left New Zealand but O. Hadžiahmetović and Zaim Budalica departed on the Mokoia from Auckland to Sydney in January 1909.

After the 1930s and 1940s some of the men from India (or their sons) began to bring out wives and children from India. Men from the Bhikhoo and Musa families started arriving in the 1900s to settle in the North Island. In the South Island came Mohammad Kara from Adad, in the Gujarat province, in 1907. Like other Muslim men from the Gujarat the Kara family “were all Sunni Vohras of the Hanafi branch of Islam.” Mohammed Kara apparently had spent some time in South Africa and then

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46 From: Austro-Hungarian Consul, Auckland Date: 1 October 1907 Subject: That Hercegovinians of Mohamedan religion be allowed to appear in Court in dress prescribed by their religion (R24623370), ACGS, 16211, J1, 768/ax, 1907/926.
decided to try his luck in Fiji. Whilst passing through New Zealand Kara applied for Residency and secured it. He quickly established himself as a hawker and small recycling businessman in Christchurch. In 1921 he brought out his 13 year old son Ismail and both joined the local Canterbury Indian Association at its inception in 1936. Mohammed Kara was very devout and insisted on undertaking his own Halal slaughter of chicken and sheep in his back yard until City Council bylaws restricted this. In 1949 Ismail’s son - Suliman Ismail Kara - travelled to New Zealand, aged 8 years old, to join his father and grandfather. By 1960 Suliman was operating his own dairy and would later become a founding member of the Muslim Association of Canterbury in 1977.

In 1936 the first identifiable international Muslim tertiary student arrived when Abdul Habib Sahu Khan (1918-2007), an ethnic Indian from Fiji, came to study medicine at Otago University. In World War Two he volunteered for the New Zealand Armed Services Medical Corps, working in public hospitals in Wellington, the Waikato, Rotorua, Greenlane and Auckland Public. “He joined the forces without any financial reward and when the war ended, the NZ Government awarded him with two Service Medals.” Sahu Khan graduated in May 1945 with an M.B. Ch.B. (Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery) and returned to Fiji in September 1946. The 1950s saw an influx of foreign students – many of them Muslim - from South and South-East Asia that had started following the initiation of the “Colombo Plan” on 1 July 1951 and the Commonwealth Scholarship programme. Muslim student population clusters have contributed to Islamic congregations up and down the country, although their numbers have fluctuated obviously. One of the first identifiable Muslim students

54 “MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS”, AS, 21 May 1945, p. 3.
at Canterbury University was Khalil Mohammed from Fiji, who earned a B.A. in 1955. His thesis was later turned into a book entitled “The Sugar Industry in Fiji”, published by the University in 1962.

In July 1950 the first Muslim organisation was created when the “New Zealand Muslim Association” was established in Auckland.\textsuperscript{55} There were approximately 200 Muslims in the country at the time.\textsuperscript{56} Over the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s there was an influx of East European, Asian and Fiji Indian migrants, refugees and students who made various contribution. In April 1959 the Association acquired a property for use as an Islamic Centre in central Auckland and in 1960 the first Imam arrived here to lead the prayers and teach children the Quran: Maulana Ahmed Said Musa Patel (1937-2009) from Gujarat, India.\textsuperscript{57} This was followed elsewhere by the creation of the Wellington-based “International Muslim Association of New Zealand” (commonly abbreviated to “IMAN”) over 1962 to 1964, and the “Muslim Association of Canterbury” in 1977. In 1969 the first Tablighi Jama’at visited New Zealand to recruit and train members, and they have been staging regular annual Ijtema gatherings in Auckland since 1976.

In May 1951 the SS Goya arrived bringing hundreds of refugees including dozens of Muslim men from Eastern Europe, some of whom would quickly be involved in Islamic organisations. Several were to settle in the South Island: Adem Firkatovic and Samso Jusovic settled in Christchurch. Born in 1930 Adem Firkatovic, a farm labourer from Sarajevo who escaped from Tito’s army, settled in Harewood, married a local girl and set up a business. Jusovic - also known as Yusovich - was born on 20 October 1936 in Dusnacha, Bosnia. According to the records of the IRO (International Refugee Organisation) Jusovic was described as a farm labourer and living in exile in


\textsuperscript{57} Drury, pp. 13-19.
Italy, under the name Semcho Gioussovitch, when he was accepted for the refugee programme. When he died on 8 June 1990 Jusovic was perhaps one of the oldest Muslim refugees in Canterbury. Mansoor Khawaja and Jafar Hall, an English convert to Islam resident in Christchurch, visited him in a hospice where he expressed a strong desire to visit and pray at the mosque. A sympathetic obituary was recorded in the national Muslim newsletter:

“One of the Yugoslavian Brother, Samso Yusovich died at the age of 69 on 8th June 1990. He came to NZ in the early 1950’s and met out Muslim brothers for the first time a few weeks ago and was still able to recite kalimah shahadah, Alhamdulillah. It was a very sad moment especially for the few brothers who used to visit him occasionally. He was buried on 11th June in Ruru cemetery.”

However perhaps the two most intriguing characters from the SS Goya were Mazhar Kransiqi and Akif Keskin. Kransiqi was born in Kosova in 1931 and worked at a plethora of jobs across New Zealand before establishing a business in Auckland. He attended the “1st Muslim Congress” of the New Zealand Muslim Association and served on the Executive Committee until his retirement in 1992. He was president of the Association in 1975 and again in 1987. He helped facilitate the development of the Halal meat export trade in the 1970s and 1980s, and in April 1979 was elected inaugural president of the first national Muslim organisation – the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ). On 31 December 2002 Krasniqi was

59 “Lectures and Meetings”, NZH, 23 December 1955, p. 16.  
awarded the Queens Service Medal for public service for his decades of community work for Albanian immigrants and the broader Muslim minority.\(^{61}\)

Akif Keskin from Macedonia was a wildly different story.

Officially Akif Keskin was born on 27 July 1923 in Skopje but his family, however, assert he was born in 1924 and added a year to his life in order to fight during World War Two. His father Mehmet was a Muslim farmer but very little is known about Akif Keskin’s early life except that as part of the Islamic minority of Macedonia his family most certainly looked upon Turkey and Turks favourably. The family was basically Slavic but in New Zealand Keskin always identified himself publicly as a Turk; when he was young his father had remarried to an Albanian woman and Keskin certainly spoke their language. An older generation of Albanian migrants to New Zealand who knew him personally, insist that Keskin was essentially Albanian. According to the IRO roll Keskin was described as a furrier by trade\(^{62}\) although his first job in New Zealand was with Fletcher Construction Ltd. in Dunedin as a plasterer. He also worked as a grid blaster at a hydro dam in Otago and when the Internal Affairs Department held an internal review of the SS Goya refugees Keskin was working at the freezing works at Pareora, outside Timaru.\(^{63}\) In 1953 he married a Roman Catholic spinster from Germany and they had three children. Three years later Keskin opened his first restaurant on Princess Street in central Dunedin - most probably the first Turkish restaurant in New Zealand and possibly one of the first to manufacture yoghurt, pizza and American style hamburgers in this country. The Otago Daily Times reported in 1959:


\(^{62}\) (IA/52/15) or Internal Affairs; Series 52; Reference 15 "Immigrant Name List Goya".

\(^{63}\) (L/22/5) or Labour Department Series 22, Reference 5.
“Mr Akif Keskin, Turkish proprietor of the Istanbul Restaurant, demonstrated yesterday that enmity between Turks and New Zealanders is a thing of the past. A score of Gallipoli veterans as well as the Mayor, Mr T. K. S. Sidey, and Mr F. J. Gray, of the R.S.A., sat down at his table for a specially prepared Turkish lunch. The Turkish flag and Union Jack hung side by side above the gathering, and a floral wreath depicting a crescent moon and five-pointed star carried the words: “Peace and Goodwill to all Nations on behalf of the Turkish Government.”

Over the next two decades Akif Keskin regularly hosted the Gallipoli veterans then R.S.A. members for dinner every Anzac Day at his restaurant. In 1964 Keskin was photographed by the Otago Daily Times marching with war veterans through Dunedin’s main street for the Anzac Day service and the following year he accompanied a group to Turkey to mark the 50th anniversary of the battle. In 1976 Br Akif Keskin left. Initially he returned to Europe, planning to settle in Germany with his wife and children. However in 1977 Keskin and his son Anafa visited Skopje and later moved to California. Keskin was last interviewed by the Otago Daily Times in April 1982 attending the Anzac Day parade in Dunedin. In 1989 he became crook and travelling with a close Albanian friend, died on 4 December 1991 at the age of 67. Akif Keskin, the Turk of Dunedin, was buried at the Muslim cemetery in Orange County, outside Los Angeles.

64 “Cenotaph Ceremony”, ODT, 27 April, 1959, p. 5.
65 “Duty Done By Soldiers To Country In Peril”, ODT, 26 April, 1960, p. 5.
The Last Three Decades

In April 1979 the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand was created with Mazhar Krasniqi as first president, to serve as national Muslim organisation devoted to the certification of Halal export meat.\textsuperscript{69} Since the 1980s there has been a steady increase in the number of Muslim immigrants, refugees and students from Asia, the Middle East and Africa, followed by a corresponding increase in the size, scope and quantity of Muslim organisations, mosques and facilities - especially in Auckland.

Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to briefly overview the history of the entire Muslim community of New Zealand from the 1850s to the 1950s. I wanted to focus on the earlier formative period, that first one hundred years that laid the groundwork for the subsequent events and issues of more recent decades. During this era there was a total absence of any formal Islamic institutions and early New Zealand Muslim History is populated by fascinating individuals carving out their own personal or familial definition of Muslim identity negotiated according to their own education and comprehension of the faith: some gave their children distinctly Muslim names, others expressed religious sentiments in their Wills. Many made oaths on the Quran when called in to court cases.

Today the Islamic community in New Zealand is exceptionally diverse in detail and following the eruptive proliferation of Islamic organisations after 1990 it has become progressively harder to generalize about with any accuracy. In the final analysis of these long historical excurses and surveys, looking to the future, one can only hope

\textsuperscript{69} FIANZ Annual Report 2012 (Wellington – 2012).
that the community structures built on these historic foundations will be substantive rather than decorative.

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Demography of New Zealand’s Muslims: Patterns and Disparities

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This article highlights the main demographic and socio-economic patterns of Muslims in New Zealand from a comparative perspective. The population of New Zealand Muslims has witnessed substantial increase over the past decades: from about 6000 in 1991 to approximately 46,000 in 2013; which is also estimated to reach more than 100,000 by 2030. This sits well with the global pattern identifying the religion of Islam as the world’s fastest growing religion. According to the findings of this analysis, the underlying conclusion emphasizes the fact that the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of New Zealand Muslims vary substantially across ethnic origins so that without paying attention to the role of ethnic origin, they will also remain ‘misunderstood population’.

Introduction

This analysis focuses on the status of Muslim population in New Zealand and compares them with other religious groups from a demographic and socio-economic perspective. The discussion is mainly based on the 2006 population census data, unless otherwise other censuses are specified in this article. In general, the total population of Muslims in New Zealand has increased substantially over the past decades: from about 6,000 in 1991 to approximately 36,000 in 2006 (that is, six times population growth). In the latest census in 2013, this number increased to 46,149. According to The Future of the Global Muslim Population, the population of New Zealand Muslims is projected to increase to 101,000 by 2030, which will include 2.0 per cent of the country’s whole population (Pew Research Center 2011).
In comparison with other religious groups in New Zealand, Muslims are the third largest religious group so that Muslims comprise almost 1 per cent of the country’s total population. The corresponding proportion is greater for Hindus (1.6 per cent) and Buddhists (1.3 per cent) as the first and second largest religious minorities in New Zealand, respectively. It is also interesting to mention that Christians are the predominant religious group in New Zealand so that about half of the country’s total population in both 2006 and 2013 censuses were Christians. More importantly, a substantial and growing proportion of New Zealand population are those who are affiliated with “no religion” (27.0 per cent in 2001, 31.5 per cent in 2006, and 42 per cent in 2013). This tends to accord with the global pattern of secularism, which is particularly a more visible pattern in the western settings (e.g. van Tubergen 2007; Voas 2009; Kaufman et al. 2012; Foroutan 2015).

**Ethnic Diversity**

The results of this analysis show that in terms of migration status, New Zealand Muslims are predominantly overseas-born: about 75 per cent of them are immigrants and only approximately a quarter of them were born in New Zealand. This pattern remains almost the same in 2001, 2006 and 2013. Further, the distribution of New Zealand Muslim migrants by birthplace indicates that they came from a wide range of the countries from throughout the world. Fijians are the largest Muslim community including almost one-fifth of New Zealand Muslims. Iraqis are the second largest ethnic group of Muslims, followed by Afghans who contain about 8 per cent and 6 per cent of New Zealand Muslims, respectively. The remaining major birthplaces of New Zealand Muslims are Somalia, Pakistan, India, Iran, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia. These 11 birthplaces together include about 80 per cent of total Muslim population in New Zealand. The remaining 20 per cent of New Zealand Muslims are extensively distributed across a wide range of countries from throughout the world,
which mainly include countries such as South Africa, Egypt, other Middle Eastern countries, Turkey, England, Singapore, and Australia.

Moreover, we can compare Muslims with non-Muslims in terms of ethnic origin. It should be mentioned that this comparative analysis is based on the 11 major birthplaces mentioned above which account for birthplaces of about 80 per cent of New Zealand Muslims. Accordingly, two major patterns can be addressed. The first pattern refers to a group of birthplaces in which the population of Muslims exceeds non-Muslims. This particularly applies to Afghanistan-born and Somali-born migrants. This means that 95 per cent of each of these two groups of migrants are Muslims. The corresponding proportion is also markedly high both for Bangladesh-born migrants (86 per cent) and for Pakistan-born migrants (76 per cent). Also, slightly more than half of Iran-born migrants are Muslims (53 per cent). Second, the opposite applies to a group of birthplaces in which the population of non-Muslims exceeds Muslims. For instance, only about 5 per cent of India-born and Malaysia-born populations are Muslims and their remaining majority are non-Muslims. Also, although Fijians are the largest migrant community of New Zealand Muslims, only 17 per cent of Fiji-born migrants are Muslims.

**Gender composition**

Generally speaking, New Zealand holds a female-dominated population, with a sex ratio of about 96.0. This means that, on average, there are almost 96 males per 100 females. However, further analysis by religious groups shows that while this general pattern applies to both Christians and Buddhists, other religious groups are male-dominated. In particular, this gender disparity becomes more visible when we compare Christians and Muslims: while Christian population is predominantly female-dominated (about 85 males per 100 females, on average), Muslims hold a
significantly male-dominated population (about 115 males per 100 females, on average).

Moreover, detailed analysis reveals that the gender composition of New Zealand Muslim population varies substantially in terms of their ethnic groups. On the one hand, the population of Muslims from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Muslims born in New Zealand are male-dominated. This is substantially a more visible observation among Pakistani Muslims for whom sex ratio is almost 140 (males per 100 females). On the other hand, the gender composition of Indonesian, Malaysian, Fijian and Somali Muslims is female-dominated. This pattern particularly applies to Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims for whom sex ratio is less than 80 (males per 100 females). These gender disparities can be partly explained by the main types of migration. This suggests that gender composition among working migrants are more likely to be male-dominated population, whereas studying migrants may hold a more female-dominated population.

**Age structure**

It is well-known that age plays a vital role in the life and status of human beings. Because of such a crucial role, it is important to consider the place of age in our demographic analysis on religion. In general, the age structure of New Zealand population varies substantially by religious affiliation. According to our analysis, two varying patterns can be addressed. On the one hand, Christians hold the oldest age structure with a median age of 40 years, which means that half of them are older than 40 years and the other half are younger than that age. Then, Jewish also have a relatively older age structure with a median age of 35 years old. On the other hand, two groups have a substantially younger age structure: those affiliated with ‘no religion’ and Muslims with a median age of 25 years old.
Although Muslims as a whole represent one of the youngest age structures in New Zealand, this does not necessarily apply to all Muslims when their ethnic origin is also taken into account. Our analysis indicates the fact that age structure of Muslims is substantially associated with their major birthplaces. According to this analysis, two main patterns can be addressed. First, a group of Muslims have a relatively older age structure with a median age around 30 years old. This includes New Zealand Muslims born in Iran, Bangladesh, Fiji, Iraq, India, and Indonesia. Second, the opposite exists among New Zealand Muslims born in Somalia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Afghanistan. They hold a younger age structure with a median age of 20 years old. In particular, Muslims born in New Zealand are exceptionally young with a median age of around 5 years old. This suggests that they are predominantly the children of Muslim parents.

From a comparative perspective, the age structure of Muslims and non-Muslims in New Zealand by birthplace indicates a key pattern: Muslims are younger than non-Muslims. Although this key pattern exists in almost all places of birth, it is a more visible observation for two groups: Pakistan-born Muslims and non-Muslims (with median ages of 20 years and 55 years old, respectively) and New Zealand-born Muslims and non-Muslims (with median ages of 5 years and 30 years old, respectively). However, the only exception to this key pattern is the case of Somali-born population who hold equally a very young age structure (with a median age of 20 years old), whether Muslims or non-Muslims.

**Duration of Residence**

There is also a large body of literature documenting the fact that the status and success of migrants is closely associated with the duration of residence in the receiving country (e.g. Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1995; Friedberg, 2000, Adsera and Chiswick, 2007; Foroutan 2013). As mentioned before, New Zealand Muslims are also largely overseas-born. Accordingly, this critical determinant has also been considered in the
The results of this analysis show that the distribution of New Zealand population in terms of duration of residence varies substantially by religious affiliation. According to these results, two main patterns can be addressed. First, Christians are the longest-term residents: almost 60 per cent of them have lived in New Zealand for 10 years or more. The corresponding proportion is also markedly high both for those affiliated with ‘no religion’ and for Jewish (almost 50 per cent). Second, the opposite applies to the rest of religious groups, demonstrating the fact that they are mostly recent arrivals in New Zealand. This is particularly the case for Muslim and Hindu populations: approximately 75 per cent of them have lived in New Zealand for less than 10 years.

However, detailed analysis reveals the fact that the length of residence among New Zealand Muslims is substantially associated with their birthplace. While one-third of Fijian Muslims are long-term residents in New Zealand, the corresponding proportion for Afghan Muslims is less than 10 per cent. Also, New Zealand Muslims born in Iraq, Iran, Bangladesh and Indonesia are relatively long-term residents: approximately a quarter of them have lived in New Zealand for 10 years or more. The corresponding proportion is about 15 per cent for the rest (including Muslims born in India, Somalia, Malaysia, and Pakistan), which indicates that they are predominantly recent arrivals in New Zealand.

Further, according to the findings of this analysis regarding the comparison between New Zealand Muslims and non-Muslims, there is one major pattern: non-Muslims are relatively longer-term residents than Muslims. This major pattern exists in almost all categories of birthplaces. However, it particularly applies to migrants born in Malaysia and Pakistan: half of non-Muslims are long-term residents in New Zealand, whereas the corresponding proportion is only 15 per cent for Muslims.
Educational attainment

It has been widely documented in the literature that educational attainment as the most important part of human capital plays as a vehicle of socio-economic development (e.g. Becker 1962; Hook and Balistreri 2002). The literature also identifies education as a key determinant of migrants’ settlement and success (e.g. Becker 1962; Gregory 2002; Cob-Clark 2003; Kler 2006; Adsera and Chiswick 2007; Fuller and Martin 2012; Foroutan 2013). Accordingly, this important factor has also been included in this analysis.

The results of this analysis show that the distribution of New Zealand population in terms of education level varies markedly by religious affiliation. According to these results, two main patterns can be addressed. On the one hand, Jewish and Hindus hold the highest education level so that almost one-third of them are highly educated (that is, with tertiary education). The corresponding proportion is also high both for Buddhists and for Muslims (about 22 per cent). On the other hand, Christians and people affiliated with ‘no religion’ are substantially less educated. In fact, a quarter of Christians and more than one-fifth of people with ‘no religion’ have no qualification. These general patterns also apply both to males and to females. It appears that these educational differentials can be partly explained by the more recent migration policies targeting individuals with high skill and high qualification. This tends to be particularly the case for Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus who are predominantly recent migrants as compared with Christians, which has been discussed in the previous section of this study.

Moreover, the detailed analysis on New Zealand Muslims’ educational level shows that there are substantial variations among them across their birthplace. According to this analysis, the typical variation exists among two major groups of Muslims: while half of Bangladeshi and Indian Muslims are highly educated (i.e. with tertiary
education), the corresponding proportion is only 5 per cent for Afghan and Somali Muslims. In fact, about one-third of Afghan and Somali Muslims hold no qualification. Further, Pakistani and Iraqi Muslims are relatively highly educated as more than one-third of them hold tertiary education. The corresponding proportions for Malaysian, Indonesian and Iranian Muslims are also relatively high (that is, 25 per cent, 23 per cent, and 21 per cent respectively). More importantly, the largest migrant Muslim community (that is, Fijian Muslims) also hold a very low education level: only one-tenth of them are highly educated (i.e. with tertiary education).

In addition, the comparisons between Muslims and non-Muslims in New Zealand demonstrate that there are varying patterns regarding their educational differentials by birthplace. According to the results of this analysis, two major patterns can be addressed. First, in three cases, Muslims hold a higher education level than non-Muslims. This pattern exists when we compare Muslims and non-Muslims born in India, Pakistan, and Iraq: Muslims born in each of these three birthplaces are more educated than non-Muslims from the same birthplaces. Second, the opposite exist in the rest of birthplaces. This particularly applies to three birthplaces (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Iran): non-Muslims born in each of these birthplaces are more likely to be highly educated than Muslims from the same birthplaces.

**Employment and Occupation Status**

According to the literature, market employment operates as a sound indicator of human life style and that of migrants’ settlement and success (e.g. Collins 1986; VandenHeuvel and Wooden 1996; Alba and Nee 2003; Pichler 2011; Foroutan 2013). The results of this analysis show that the employment status of New Zealand population varies substantially by religious affiliation. According to these results, two main patterns can be addressed. On the high end, Christians and people affiliated with ‘no religion’ are the most likely to be employed as they hold the lowest
unemployment rate. Almost similar patterns apply to Jewish. For instance, the unemployment rates of these three religious groups have never reached 10 per cent over the past decades. On the low end, the rest of religious groups hold a relatively higher unemployment rate. This particularly applies to Muslims who are the least likely to be employed and hold the highest unemployment rate. These two main patterns exist almost constant over the time in 1996, 2001 and 2006 censuses. Furthermore, the unemployment rate has decreased in 2006 relative to the previous years. While this pattern applies to all religious groups, it is a more evident observation for Muslims: the fall of unemployment rate from 20 per cent in 1996 and 2001 to 12 per cent in 2006. However, Muslims still hold the highest unemployment rate: in particular, Muslims are three times more likely to be unemployed than Christians (with unemployment rate of 12 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively).

However, the detailed analysis indicates that there is no one single pattern of employment status for Muslims in New Zealand. This suggests that the employment patterns of New Zealand Muslims vary substantially across the major birthplaces. According to the detailed findings of this analysis, two typical patterns can be addressed. First, Indian and Fijian Muslims hold a substantially high employment level so that only about 7 per cent of them are unemployed. Second, the opposite applies to Somali and Afghan Muslims: about one-third of Somali Muslims and one-fifth of Afghan Muslims are unemployed. It is also important to mention that Indonesian and Pakistani Muslims hold a relatively high level of employment as only about 10 per cent of them are unemployed. However, the unemployment rate is relatively high (approximately 15 per cent) for Iraqi, Iranian and Malaysian Muslims.

In addition, the comparison between Muslims and non-Muslims in New Zealand in terms of employment status indicate a key general pattern: Muslims are less likely to be employed than non-Muslims. Although this pattern applies to all birthplaces, the
magnitude of these employment differentials is significantly associated with the birthplaces: On the high end, among both Pakistan-born and Somali-born migrants, Muslims are about three times more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims. The gap is also high among individuals born in Malaysia: Muslims are approximately twice more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims. On the low end, there are smaller employment differentials for other birthplaces, which apply to the three ethnic groups of Muslims who hold the highest level of employment. This refers to the employment differentials between Muslims and non-Muslims from India, Fiji and Indonesia: although Muslims are more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims, this Muslim/non-Muslim difference is small. The gap is also small between Muslims and non-Muslims from Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. For example, 15 per cent of Muslim Iranians and 11 per cent of non-Muslims Iranians are unemployed. However, it should be mentioned that the only exception to these key general patterns of employment refers to the situation of Bangladesh-born Muslims and non-Muslims. This suggests that in contrary to the general pattern, among Bangladeshi migrants: non-Muslims hold a relatively higher unemployment rate than Muslims. However, this is not really a big gap: about 15 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively.

The final theme considered in this analysis is occupational status. The results of this analysis suggest that the occupational status of working population in New Zealand varies markedly by religious affiliation. According to this analysis, three general patterns can be addressed. First, the most evident occupational pattern refers to the fact that Jewish hold a greater proportion of managerial and professional occupations than other religious groups. This key pattern remains constant over the time (that is, 1996, 2001, and 2006). Second, in the past (that is, in 1996 and 2001 censuses), people with ‘no religion’ and Christians had the lowest occupational level. Third, in more recent year (i.e. 2006 census), a particular religious group holds the lowest level
of managerial and professional occupations than all other religious groups in New Zealand: Muslims.

**Concluding Remarks**

This study has highlighted the main demographic and socio-economic patterns of Muslims in New Zealand from a comparative perspective. The total population of New Zealand Muslims has increased substantially from about 6,000 in 1991 to approximately 46,000 in 2013, and is estimated to reach more than 100,000 by 2030. This accords with the global pattern which identifies the religion of Islam as the fastest growing religion in the world (e.g. Pew Research Center 2011; Foroutan 2015).

According to the results of this analysis, both Muslims and those affiliated with ‘no religion’ hold the youngest age structure in New Zealand, with a median age of about 25 years old. In terms of gender composition, the population of New Zealand Muslims is predominantly male-dominated, which is particularly in contrary to the substantially female-dominated population of Christians. Likewise many religious minorities, Muslims are also new arrivals to New Zealand so that only about a quarter of them are long-term residents and the majority of them have lived less than 10 years in New Zealand. Moreover, the results of this analysis have shown that about one-fifth of New Zealand Muslims are highly educated. They also hold the highest unemployment rate as compared with other religious groups in New Zealand.

However, the detailed analysis discussed in this article has explored a more important point: these general demographic and socio-economic patterns vary substantially across the ethnic origins of New Zealand Muslims. For instance, while the proportion highly educated is 50 per cent for Bangladeshi and Indian Muslims, it is only 5 per cent for both Afghan and Somali Muslims. Also, the proportion of long-term residence in New Zealand for Fijian Muslims is three times greater than the
corresponding proportion for Afghan Muslims. The same patterns of ethnic variation apply to the remaining demographic and socio-economic characteristics of New Zealand Muslims which have been discussed in detail in this article.

Finally, the findings of this analysis provide further research-based evidence to support the author’s key argument documented in Misunderstood Population?: Methodological Debate on Demography of Muslims: “Muslims share one basic common item in the datasets used in our studies and other demographic analyses: ticking the same category of response for the question related to religious affiliation—that is, they all self-identify as Muslims. But this does not necessarily mean that Muslims can be considered homogenous as their compositional differentials arising from ethnic origins cannot be ignored in our studies and other demographic analyses. As long as this vital methodological caution is overlooked, then Muslims in the western contexts still remain misunderstood populations” (Foroutan 2015). Accordingly, it is critically important to emphasise that in order to provide accurate information and reliable knowledge on New Zealand Muslims, they should also be considered and studied by major ethnic origins and not just simply under a single category as ‘Muslims in New Zealand’.

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