While the World Health Organization (WHO) reported (opens in a new tab) in February such a leak was “extremely unlikely”, it later advised (opens in a new tab) more work was needed to rule it out.
But the real problem is not what might have happened in China — it’s that there is no meaningful international legal oversight in the first place.
The United Nations’ Convention on Biological Diversity (opens in a new tab) puts the onus on individual countries to regulate their own biotech industries. While there are protocols for the safe handling and transfer of living modified organisms, there are still no agreed international standards (opens in a new tab) governing laboratory safety, monitoring and information sharing.
This is concerning, given the long history of disease breaches at both civilian and military research establishments.
Laboratory escapes have included smallpox (1966, 1972 and 1978), H1N1 “swine flu” (1977 but probably a 1950s-era sample), Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (opens in a new tab) (1995) and at least six outbreaks of SARS (with two distinct events (opens in a new tab) at the same Beijing laboratory in 2004).
In 2014, it was thought up to 75 workers might have been exposed to anthrax after an accident (opens in a new tab) at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, raising real concerns about pathogen safety. The same year, five researchers died while working on West African Ebola (opens in a new tab) in Sierra Leone.
Accidents will happen
Rapid advances in biotechnology and the decentralisation of research industries have only increased (opens in a new tab) the potential risks. Without greater control, it’s feared a new or revived disease could be inadvertently released (opens in a new tab).
Already, researchers (opens in a new tab) have accidentally created a lethal mouse-pox virus, intentionally developed a synthetic strain of the polio virus, resurrected the virus that caused the 1918 influenza, and recreated an infectious horse-pox virus by ordering DNA fragments online.
The potential risk from hostile state or terrorist acts in this area is clear, which makes the lack of global oversight all the more alarming.
This is true for even the highest risk “biosafety level 4 (opens in a new tab)” laboratories, such as the one in Wuhan. Analysis suggests these facilities can be operated safely (opens in a new tab), but individual countries and regions such as Europe (opens in a new tab) are setting their own standards (opens in a new tab). There is also a preparedness gap (opens in a new tab) between wealthy and poor countries.
The risk of bioterrorism
Beyond the WHO’s guidelines, however, there is no universal law, regulation or international oversight mandating even basic requirements, such as external independent inspections. We don’t even know how many level 4 laboratories exist. Officially there are 54, but some probably remain undisclosed for national security reasons.
The exclusion of military establishments from independent oversight compounds the problem. An international convention (opens in a new tab) prohibits the creation, stockpiling and use of bioweapons, but there are only soft commitments to compliance and monitoring. Attempts to create a binding verification protocol have so far failed.
Read more:
Biden's new Wuhan lab leak investigation ramps up US-China blame game (opens in a new tab)
The UN Security Council, which monitors this regime, has noted a disturbing trend (opens in a new tab) of countries not participating in its voluntary mechanisms and a lack of effective controls.
In any case, many countries lack the capacity to adequately detect disease outbreaks. Those that do have the capacity are often unco-ordinated and ineffective.
The general failure of effective oversight makes the risk of bioterrorism (opens in a new tab) higher than it should be.
Global agreement urgently needed
Whether or not the conclusive truth about Wuhan ever emerges, if the international community is serious about minimising the risk of biotech accidents it could look to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (opens in a new tab) as a model.
This would mean a system for enforcing global standards, independent inspections and support for best scientific practice.
Read more:
Covid-19: why the lab leak theory must be formally investigated (opens in a new tab)
It would need to cover any location or establishment where there is a significant risk from human activity that could intentionally, accidentally or recklessly cause an outbreak.
All countries would have to become more transparent to accept such a rules-based international order. And while it’s possible, even probable, that China needs to improve its own systems, it is certainly far from alone in that.
Alexander Gillespie (opens in a new tab), Professor of Law, University of Waikato (opens in a new tab)
This article is republished from The Conversation (opens in a new tab) under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article (opens in a new tab).
